CAUSES OF SUCCESS OF EAST INDIA COMPANY AGAINST FRENCH

Causes for the failure of the French (after three Carnatic Wars)

The French position which at one time dazzled the Indian world by its political successes was destined to end in humiliation and failure. There were various causes responsible for the defeat of the French and the victory of the English.

French Continental Preoccupations – The continental ambitions of France in the 18^th century considerably strained her resources. The French monarchs of the time were fighting for ‘natural frontiers’ for their county which meant acquisition of new territories towards the low countries, extension of the frontier to the Rhine and towards Italy. Such expansionist schemes involved that country deeper and deeper into the political muddle of Europe, taxed her energies and kept her constantly at war with the states of Europe. France cared more for a few hundred square miles of territory on her frontier to bigger stakes in North America of India. France attempted simultaneously the difficult task of continental expansion and colonial acquisitions. This divided her resources and made her an unequal to the task in facing her adversaries. It was the misfortune of France that she gained almost nothing on the continent and lost her colonial possessions also. England, on the other hand did not covet an inch of European territory. A part of Europe, England felt herself apart from it. England’s interests in Europe were mainly confined to the maintenance of a balance of power in that continent. England’s ambition was mainly colonial and in this single-minded objective she came off with flying colors. She won the struggle both in India and North America and worsted off France in both these regions.

Different systems of government in England and France – French historians have rightly attributed the failure of France in the colonial struggle to the inferior system of government prevalent in France as compared to the English system of government. The French government was despotic and depended on the personality of the monarch. Even under Louis XIV, the ‘Grand Monarque’, the system was showing serious cracks. The numerous wars that Louis XIV waged sapped the vitality of the state, ruined her financial resources and made French power look like an inflated balloon. The deluge followed close on his death. His weak and sensual successor, Louis XV frittered away the resources of France upon his numerous mistresses and other favorites like dancers and hair dressers. England, on the other hand, was ruled by an enlightened oligarchy. Under the rule of the Whig Party, England took great strides towards a constitutional set up, reducing the British realm into ‘a sort of a crowded republic’. The system showed considerable vitality and grew from strength to strength. Alfred Lyall emphasizes the rottenness of the French system of government when he writes: “India was not lost by the French because Dupleix was recalled, or because La Bourbonnais and D’Ache both left the coast at critical moments or because Lally was headstrong and intractable. Still less was the loss due to any national inaptitude for distant and perilous enterprises in which the French have displayed high qualities… it was through the short-sighted, ill-managed, European policy of Louis XV, misguided by his mistresses and by incompetent ministers, that France lost her Indian settlement in the Seven Years War”.

Differences in the organization of the two companies – The French Company was a department of the state. The Company had been launched with a share capital of 5 ½ million livres out of which the monarch subscribed 3 ½ million livres. Its directors were nominated by the King from the shareholders and they carried on the decisions of two high commissioners appointed by the government. Since the state guaranteed dividend to the shareholders, the latter took very little interest in promoting the prosperity of the company. So great was the lack of public interest that from 1725-1765 the shareholders never met and the company was managed by a department of the state. Under these circumstances the financial position of the French Company progressively deteriorated. At one stage the resources of the company dwindled to such a low ebb that it had to sell its trading rights to a group of merchants form St. Malo for an annual payment. From 1721 to 1740 the company traded or borrowed capital. Constantly propped up by subsidies from the royal treasury, the company was kept going by monopoly of tobacco and gambling in lotteries. Such a company was ill equipped to support the ambitions of Dupleix or finance his expensive wars. The English Company, on the other hand was an independent commercial corporation. While this company could not remain altogether unaffected by the political upheavals in England, the interference of the governments into its day-to-day affairs was very little. Whoever controlled the administration in England, the King or Parliament, there was great interest in the ruling circles for the wellbeing of the Company. Compared to the French company, the English company was financially sounder, its trade was far more extensive and business methods better. the directors of the English company always emphasized the importance of trade. With them trade came first and politics later on. The English Company earned enough to finance its wars. It has been estimated that during 1736-1756, the total sales of the English company was higher than the French. Financially the English company was so rich that at one time it was in danger of being regarded as a milch cow by the government of England.

When Dupleix inaugurated the policy of making political gains to compensate for the declining profits of the French company he took the first step towards its decline.

Role of the Navy – The events of the Carnatic Wars amply demonstrate how the fortunes of the two companies waxed and waned with their strength on the seas. During 1746, French successes on land followed her naval superiority along the Coromandel Coast. True, the English naval power did not assert its superiority during the few years following 1748, more because England and France were officially at peace. Dupleix’s astounding successes were won during 1748-51 when the English navy was temporarily out of action. The naval superiority of England during the Seven Years War placed Count de Lally at a grievous disadvantage and he could not hope to repeat the exploits of Dupleix. The retirement of French fleet under D’Ache from the Indian waters left the field clear for the English and their final victory was no longer in doubt. During the Austrian War of Succession French maritime strength was so greatly used that according to Voltaire she was left with no warships during the Seven Years War. Pitt the Elder made the maximum use of the superiority of England on the high seas. Superior naval force enabled the English East India Company to keep open her communications with Europe, cover her operations on land in the Carnatic by supplying reinforcements from Bombay and Calcutta and cut off and isolate French force in the Carnatic from the rest of the world. Superior maritime strength proved to be England’s most powerful weapon in the struggle for colonial supremacy. Even if other factors were equally proportioned navy would have the casting vote.

Impact of English successes in Bengal – The English conquest of Bengal in 1757 was undoubtedly of great significance. Besides enhancing the political prestige of the English company, it placed at its disposal the vast resources in wealth and manpower of Bengal. The financial resources of the English Company considerably improved. At a time when Count de Lally was ill at ease as to how to make payments to his troops, Bengal sent not only troops but supplies to the Carnatic. The Deccan was too poor to finance the political ambition of Dupleix or military schemes of Count de Lally. True, Bussy had obtained the cession of the Circars from the Nizam, but there was no evidence of any remission of funds to Southern India except the lakh and a half rupees sent by Bussy to Lally in 1758.

Decidedly the power of superior finance was on the side of the English. V. A. Smith emphatically declared, ‘Neither Bussy nor Dupleix singly, nor both combined, had a chance of success against the government which controlled the sea routes and the resources of the Gangetic Valley. It is futile to lay stress upon the personal frailties of Dupleix, Lally or lesser men in order to explain the French failure. Neither Alexander the Great nor Napoleon could have won the Empire of India by starting from Pondicherry as a base and contending with the power which held Bengal and command of the sea’. ‘Dupleix’ writes Marriott, ‘made a cardinal blunder in looking for the key of India in Madras; Clive sought and found it in Bengal’.

Respective leadership compared – The superior political leadership and military generalship of the English in India stand in striking contrast to that of the French. Perhaps Dupleix and Bussy were in no way inferior to Clive, Lawrence and Saunders. The comparison ends there. Dupleix and Bussy could do everything but enthuse the French with their own spirit; they had to depend on incompetent subordinates. Count de Lally who came to India at a critical moment was headstrong and of a violent temper. He looked upon the Company’s servants of Pondicherry as a net of dishonest rogues whom he hoped to set right by threats and punishment. He so greatly alienated his compatriots that they openly rejoiced when the English defeated him. The English on the other hand, were lucky in procuring the services of capable commanders and very many servants far superior to any of the subordinates of Dupleix and Bussy.

Responsibility of Dupleix – Dupleix not withstanding his political brilliance cannot escape the responsibility of damaging the position of the French in India because his complete absorption in political intrigues blinded him to some very important aspects of the contest. He showed comparative indifference towards the trading and financial problems of the French company. Consequently the French trading activity even otherwise not very sound began to decline rapidly. Moreover, at times he was in discreetly reckless about finances and thus ruined the prospects of his well conceived political plans. It is rather intriguing that a man of Dupleix’s imagination in believing that the policy he had adopted in the Deccan was politically expedient. The English would not easily accept Dupleix’s new position as governor of all the Mughal territories south of the river Krishna. Further he failed to grasp the fact that the Anglo French conflict in India was merely a projection of the clash of political and imperial ambitions of the two countries in Europe and the New World. In addition, Dupleix suffered from such an overwhelming self-confidence that he did not appraise his superior authorities in Paris even about some of the serious military and naval setbacks suffered by the French in India. Thus, if he did not get timely reinforcements from France the fault is greatly his.

It must not be forgotten that India was one of the many theatres of the world wide struggle between England and France for colonial supremacy and that the English, on a general summation, proved to be superior contenders.

PINDARIS

The etymology of the word Pindari is variously explained. The most popular explanation is that the word pindari is of Marathi origin meaning ‘consumer of pinda’ a fermented drink. In the 18^th and 19^th centuries the word was used to describe the hordes of cruel marauders whose main occupation was loot and plunder.

The origin of the Pindaris is lost in obscurity. They were first heard of in 1689 during the Mughal invasion of Maharashtra. During the time of Bajirao I they were referred to as irregular horsemen attached to the Maratha army, serving without pay and receiving in lieu there of license to plunder. It is worth mentioning here that they never helped the British. They were mostly active in the areas of Rajputana and the Central Provinces and subsisted on plunder. Their leaders belonged to both the Hindu as well as the Muslim communiites. Chief amongst them were Wasil Muhammad, Chitu and Karim Khan. They had thousands of followers.

After the Battle of Panipat in 1761, the Pindari leaders settled chiefly in Malwa and served as auziliaries of Maratha chiefs like the Sindhia and the Holkar, and the Nizam, they came to be designated as Sindhia Shahi Pindaris, Holkar Shahi Pindaris and Nizam Shahi Pindaris. Malhar Rao Holkar gave one of the Pindari chiefs a golden flag; in 1794 the sindhia granted them lands in Narbada Valley which they extended soon by ‘conquests from the Grassias or original independent landlords in their neighborhood.

Malcolm had in view their connection with the Marathas when he wrote, ‘condemned from origin to be the very scavengers of the Marathas, their habits and character took from the first a shape suited to the work they had to perform’.

As the power of the Marathas declined the Pindaris became a body by themselves frequently engaged in devastating the territory of the very chiefs whom they professed to follow.

The weakness of the Mughal central authority, the corruption of weak and expiring states, the repeated plundering raids of the Marathas created conditions in India which the Pindaris role ‘like masses of putrefaction in animal matter’. The chaotic political conditions in many parts of India deprived large number of people of their peaceful occupations. The life of plunder offered an easier means of livelihood than honest labor. The Pindari ranks swelled during the Governor Generalship of Wellesley when a large body of professional soldiers were disbanded by the subsidiary allies of the East India Company. The Pindaris spread misery all around and many hardy peasants were impelled to join their ranks. The Pindaris thus formed ‘not a particular force but a system fed and nourished by the very miseries they created’.

The Pindaris did not come from any particular area or believe in any particular religion. They were a heterogeneous element drawn from the ranks of disbanded soldiers, fugitives from justice, idle, profligate and unscrupulous men both from Hinduism and Islam. The prospect of rich plunder was the only tie of cohesion among the members of a Pindari party. Their mode of warfare was a peculiar one. They avoided pitched battles with regular armies. When on march, they carried no baggage of any description and supported themselves and their horses on the grain and provision which they plundered. Their favorite (arms) weapons were long bamboo spears, some used fire arms also. Their chief merit was their speed. ‘The celerity of their marches was not more remarkable than their secrecy. It was scarcely possible to gain information for their movements till they had completed’. Like swarms of locusts they destroyed and left waste whatever province they visited. British writers like Malcolm, Princep, Duff, Tod and Thorton have given detailed accounts of the plundering raids of the Pindaris.

In the early nineteenth century the chief Pindari leaders were Chitu, Wasil Muhammad and Karim Khan. The Pindaris gradually extended the area of their operations organizing raids in the Company’s territories.

In 1812, the Pindaris plundered the districts of Mirzapur and Shahabad; in 1815 they raided the Nizams dominion and in 1816 plundered the Northern Circars (Sarkars).

Lord Hastings decided to take stern action against the Pindaris. The Court of Directors also authorized action. Hastings improved the company’s diplomatic position by concluding agreements with the Maratha chiefs, the Rajput princes and the ruler of Bhopal getting promises of help against these robber bands.

British writers like V. A. Smith, P. E. Roberts and S. M. Edwards have popularized the myth that the Pindari marauders, the Afghan free-booters and the Maratha chiefs were in league with one another and Daulat Rao Sindhia was the ‘nominal sovereign’ of the Pindaris. The problem, therefore, before the Governor General was not only to encircle the Pinadaris, but also to check the attempts of the Maratha chiefs to breakthrough to their assistance; and that the prescience of the Governor-General was fully justified, for ‘the hunt of the Pindaris became merged in the third Maratha War’.

Recent researches have proved that the population in the Maratha territories even was not safe from the depredations of the Pindaris and that Daulat Rao Sindhia himself employed his troops to suppress the Pindaris. In the summer of 1815 the Sindhia entered into a definite agreement with the Pindaris whereby the latter agreed to give up the policy of plunder and to live on the lands alotted to them by the Sindhia. Edmonstone, vice president of the Governor General’s Council, assered that the Sindhia was sincere in his desire to suppress the Pindaris and to dissociate himself from their activities. It seems Hastings ws keen on war with the Sindhia. He noted in his private journal on 23 Dec 1816: ‘It is far better if the Sindhia be resolved to risk his existence for the support of the Pindaris’. In fact, Hastings did not really desire the Sindhia’s cooperation in his campaign against the Pindaris. On the other hand, he desired war against the Sindhia and found in the campaign against the Pindaris the right opportunity to provoke him to it.

Lord Hastings wanted to suppress the Pindaris and defeat the Marathas in one sweep. For this he gathered a large army of 1.13.000 men and 300 guns and attacked the Pindaris from four sides. He himself took command of the force from the north while Sir Thomas Hislop commanded the force from the south.

By the end of 1817 the Pindaris were drive across the Chambal and by Jan 1818 their organized bands were destroyed.

In 1818, the Pindaris were completely suppressed, and all their bands disintegrated. Karim Khan was given a small estate in the Gorakhpur district of the United Provinces (Modern UP), Wasil Muhammad took refuge in the Sindhia’s camp, but the latter handed him over to the British. Wasil committed suicide in captivity. Chitu escaped to the forest where a tiger devoured him. Thus by 1824, the menace of the Pindaris came to an end.

In 1824 Malcolm wrote, ‘the Pindaris are effectually destroyed, that their name is almost forgotten’.

Duff wrote, ‘The Pindaris thus dispersed without leaders and without a home or a rendezvous, were afterwards little heard of though flying parties were seen in the Deccan until the termination of the war with the Peshwa’.

Ref: B. L. Grover and S. Grover