STUFF SIMPLIFIED: June 2022

Friday, 24 June 2022

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PARTITION OF BENGAL

The Partition of Bengal 1905

A masterpiece of Curzon’s internal policy was the partition of Bengal into two provinces of Bengal proper and eastern Bengal and Assam in 1905.

The provinces of Bengal at the time comprised Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Curzon described the partition as ‘a mere readjustment of administrative boundaries’. It was explained that the Eastern districts of Mymen Sings and Backergange divisions were notorious for lawlessness and crime and the police arrangement was unable to cope with the situation. The lieutenant Governor who was in charge of the extensive areas could not properly look after these extensive areas. Besides there had been historical precedents of the creation of separate administrative units, as the setting up of Northwest Provinces in 2865 and separation of Assam under a high commissioner in 1874.

The new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was to include Assam and the divisions of Dacca, Rajshahi and Chittagong.

The opposition to the partition of Bengal was great and vocal. The Bengal intelligentsia took it to be a subtle attack upon the growing solidarity of Bengali nationalism, an attempt to undermine the traditions, history and language of the Bengalis. The nationalists pointed out that the scheme was devised to divide the people on the basis of religion and to put the Muslims against the Hindus. Lord Curzon explained that one object of the partition proposal was to create a Mohammedan province where Islam could be predominant and its followers in ascendency.

Far more offensive was the manner in which the proposal of partition was carried out in the teeth of public opposition. The viceroy described the popular agitation as ‘partly unscrupulous and partly misinformed’, while Sir Andrew Fraser, the lieutenant Governor, attributed the agitation to vested interests of two provincial classes, the Calcutta Bar who feared a setback to other work due to the creation of a separate court at Dacca and the Calcutta journalists who feared the possibility of new newspapers being published from Dacca. Lord Morley, the new Secretary of State, declared in 1905 that the partition was a ‘settled fact’.

It was suggested to the government that united Bengal could be placed under a governor with a separate executive council as in Madras and Bombay. The viceroy turned down the proposal as unsatisfactory. Probably the best solution could be, what was done six years later, the separation of non-Bengali speaking parts of Bihar and Orissa from Bengal proper.

Sentiments on both sides clouded the real issue and poisoned the political atmosphere. The partition was forced at a psychological moment, the year of Japan’s victory over Russia. The Indian opinion was utterly disregarded.

Curzon made it a prestige issue and decided not to yield to pressure. Bengali youth accepted it as a challenge to their nationalism and pledged to undo it.

Recent researches have proved that Curzon’s main motives were political and Machiavellian, to undermine the solidarity of politically advanced Bengalis and at lessening the political influence of Calcutta in Indian affairs. In a private confidential letter to the Secretary of State on 17 February 1904, Curzon wrote ‘If we are weak enough to yield to their clamor now, we shall not be able to dismember or reduce Bengal again and you will be cementing and solidifying, on the Eastern flanks of India, a force already formidable and certain to be a source of increasing trouble in future’.

The partition of Bengal, whatever its justification from the administrative viewpoint, was a cardinal blunder of Curzon. It embittered Indo British relations. It created a breach between Muslims and Hindus for the Muslims thought that they had been deprived by the Hindus of the opportunities possible from a Muslim majority province. However, the partition and the resultant agitation gave a great fillip to the nationalist movement. The annulment of the partition in 1911 gave India a ‘sense of power’, besides inculcating love for swadeshi.

Wednesday, 22 June 2022

DISCUSS THE IMPACT OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES ON INDIAN SOCIETY AND CULTURE

Activities of the Christian Missionaries during British Rule: Christianity is reported to have entered India in the first century A.D. when St. Thomas landed on the Malabar Coast. By the 3^rd century A.D. the Syrian Christians had emerged as a body in the state of Kerala. During Akbar’s reign, in 1580, a Baptist Christian mission was set up at Fatehpur Sikri and its missionaries participated in the religious discussions at the ‘Ibadat Khana’. The Jesuit Missionaries are reported to have opened a Jesuit College at Agra in the times of Emperor Shah Jahan.

A new phase in East-West relations began when Vasco da Gama landed at Calicut in 1498. Vasco had explained the motive behind his visit thus: ‘We have come to seek Christians and spices’. The Portuguese Roman Catholic missionaries like Francis Xavier and Robert-de-Nobili, did some notable work in the field of opening some elementary schools and some orphanages.

In the 17^th and 18^th centuries, the Directors of the English East India Company and the English authorities in India adopted contradictory postures, sometimes encouraging missionary activities and at other times limiting missionary activities in India. In the 18^th century in particular the English East India merchants and officials, looked upon the Salvation Army (Christian missionaries) as a threat to their profits (they had in view the Mughal antipathy to the Portuguese Jesuits as a cautionary precedent) and put all sorts of restrictions on the entrance of missionaries in the Presidency towns.

The Seramur Missionaries – The Baptist missionaries from England – the trio, Joshua Marshman, William Carey and William Ward – wanted to start their activities from Calcutta. Lord Wellesley, the Governor General (1798-1805) considered them so ‘subversive’, ‘a menace to tranquility’, that they were banned from entering Calcutta, these missionaries were compelled to settle in the nearby Danish Settlement at Serampur. The Serampur trio did some useful work int eh field of education, setting up a printing press, translating the Ramayana and Mahabharata into English, besides attempting social reform.

The Evangelical movement in England added to the missionary influence and their popularity in London; it did influence the thinking of the Company’s Directors and the members of Parliament. As a result, the Charter Act of 1813 lifted the Company’s blanket ban on missionary activities in India, and missionaries from the UK could enter, reside, and openly preach. The Charter Act of 1833 went a step further and threw open India to missionaries of the whole world, who are free to preach and even settle in India. Consequently, many Germans and much funded American Protestant missionaries came to India. The Roman Catholic Missions also became more vigorous and their missionaries from all parts of the world poured into India.

Missionary comments on Hindu Socio-Religious Practices – The primary motive of the Christian missionaries was to convert the Indians to Christianity. In particular, they decried Hindu religion and their religious practices like idolatry and image-worship. To hammer their point, the Christian missionaries praised the tenets and practices of their religion. This evoked a sharp reaction in orthodox Hindu circles, though the missionaries did succeed in having some converts from the lower classes and in backward tribal and hill areas. All the same, the social and educational activities attracted the notice and praise of the newly western educated class.

The missionaries crusaded against the discrimination against women in Hindu society; social evils like infanticide, child marriage, polygamy, sati, forced widowhood, came under sharp condemnation. Practices like purdah, dowry system, the Devadasi practice (Bengal) and denial of proper education to women, also received their attention.

The rigidity of the caste system and untouchability were the other targets of the missionary attack. Though conversion amongst the lower castes were moderate, the inequality based on the caste system received the careful attention of the leaders of the various socio religious reformers.

The missionaries also turned over their attention to the neglected and primitive tribes like Santhals in Southern Bihar, the Marria-gonds in Madhya Pradesh and the numerous tribals in Garo hills and other areas in Northeastern state. The missionary efforts did attain some success in conversions.

In the field of social service, the missionaries were very active, though their humanitarian approach was an adjunct to their primary aim of conversions to Christianity. The missionaries opened many medical dispensaries, some hospitals and some medical institutions to win the hears of the weaker sections of Indian society. Similarly, they opened some orphanages for the physically handicapped and blind. Service centers were also opened during epidemics, famines, droughts, floods, etc. The missionaries won notable success in the field of education, production of vernacular literature, setting up printing presses and publications. In this field, the missionaries worked as pioneers, when they opened modern elementary schools, made provisions for teaching English language, set up teachers training institutions, set up special schools for girls, which provided vocational education also. The missionaries did valuable work in the field of adult education and carried on novel experiments in rural education in their schools at Moga, Salem, Madak, Ankaleshwar, Dernakal and at several other places. During 1936-37, there were 14,341 missionary institutions, with a total student strength of 1,118,200 on their rolls. The total expenditure involved was over Rs, 38 million.

In the political field, the missionary activity, particularly in the fields of political awakening and development of Nationalist outlook was only marginal.

An overview: Many Western scholars and apologists of missionary activities in introducing the modern printing press in India, opening of Westernized type of schools, commenting on the rich cultural heritage of the Indian classics, focusing attention of socio-religious evils in the Indian set up and popularizing humanitarian values in society. The missionary’s condemnation of deficiencies in Indian religious practices evoked reactions among Indian leaders, who earnestly turned their attention to socio-religious reforms in Indian society. Taken in this light – both in action and reaction – the missionaries become heralds of modernization in India.

DISCUSS WILLIAM BENTICK’S EFFORTS TO BAN SATI SYSTEM IN INDIA

No previous Governor General of India had ever tackled social problems with greater courage than Bentinck did. He tried to reform Hindu society by abolition of the cruel rite of Sati and suppression of infanticide. He crushed the gangs of assassins called ‘thugs’ and made peaceful living possible.

The term ‘Sati’ literally means ‘a pure and virtuous woman’. It is used in the case of a devoted wife who contemplates perpetual and uninterrupted conjugal union with her husband life after life and as a proof thereof burns herself with the dead body of her husband. The belief that the dead need company and victuals in their journey to far off Paradise was prevalent among many primitive peoples, and it was customary to bury, with the body of a chief, his drinking bowls, horses, dogs, and even his favorite wives and concubines. Probably this practice was brought to India by the Indo-Scythian invaders. In India its popularity was due to a false sense of conjugal duty sanctioned by society and religion, though the motivating urges were economic and moral.

Some enlightened Indian princes had taken steps to abolish this cruel practice in their dominions. Emperor Akbar had attempted to restrict it. The Marathas had forbidden it in their dominions. The Portuguese at Goa and the French at Chandernagore had also taken some steps towards its abolition. The East India Company had however adhered to its declared policy of non-interference into the social and religious customs of the people of India. Early British Governors-General like Cornwallis, Minto and Lord Hastings had taken some steps to restrict the practice of Sati by discouraging compulsion, forbidding administration of intoxicating drugs to the sorrow stricken widows, putting a ban on burning of pregnant women or widows below 16 years of age, and above all, making compulsory the presence of police officials at the time of sacrifice, who were to see that no compulsion was used. These restrictions, however, proved inadequate and unsuccessful.

Enlightened Indian reformers led by Raja Ram Mohan Roy urged William Bentinck to take necessary steps and declare the practice of Sati illegal. The loss of his sister-in-law by sati had stirred Rammohan Roy to action and he had published a number of pamphlets condemning the practice. His arguments were supported by many of the progressive Indian newspapers and the conscience of the nation had been awakened. William Bentinck provided the necessary legislative corrective. He collected relevant facts and figures about Sati cases, obtained the views of army officers, of the Judges of Nizamat Adalat, of the Superintendents of Police of the lower and upper provinces and came to the conclusion that there was no danger of mutiny or civil commotion. Regulation No XVII of December 1829 declared the practice of sati or burning or burying alive of widows illegal and punishable by the criminal courts as culpable homicide. The Regulation of 1829 was applicable in the first place to Bengal Presidency alone, but in 1830 was extended in different forms to Madras and Bombay Presidency.

No public disorders followed the enactment. A few orthodox Bengalis vainly made an appeal to the Privy Council against Government’s interference in their religious customs. Counter petitions were sent to the King by Rammohan Roy and Devendranath Tagore and William Bentinck was thanked for what he had done.

PERMANENT SETTEMENT IN BENGAL 1793

At the time of his appointment Cornwallis was specially directed to devise a satisfactory solution to the land revenue system in Bengal which should ensure the Company’s interest as well of the cultivators. The fist essential for a satisfactory approach to the problem was a thorough inquiry into the wages, tenures and rents prevalent in Bengal. Prolonged discussion followed in which the leading part was taken by Sir John Shore, the President of the Board of Revenue, Mr. James Grant, the Record Keeper and the Governor General himself. The discussion centered round three vital questions. With whom was the settlement to be made – the zamindars or the actual tillers of the soil? What would be the state’s share in the produce of the land? Should the settlement be for a term of years of permanent?

What was the position of the zamindar? Was he to be considered merely as a hereditary tax gatherer with no priority rights or was he the owner and proprietor of land? On this point John Shore and James Grant held opposite views. John Shore maintained that the zamindar was the owner of the land subject to the payment of annual land revenue to the state. As such the zamindar could bequeath the entire land to his children, sell it or mortgage it. This was the position in the later Mughal times, maintained Shore. James Grant, on the other hand maintained that the state was the owner of all land in the country, the zamindar was just the rent collecting agent and as such could be discarded at the will of the state. Cornwallis, who himself was an English landlord, accepted the viewpoint of Shore. Cornwallis’ viewpoint was very much affected by what was practicable. The company’s servants did not possess sufficient administrative experience to make a direct settlement with the ryot. The system of farming estates to the highest bidder had been tried for long with undesirable consequences. Thus, Cornwallis decided to make a settlement with the zamindars.

What was to be the basis for the revenue settlement?

James Grant maintained that the settlement should be made on the basis of the highest Mughal settlement, namely, that in force in 1765. Shore argued that in the Mughal times there was great discrepancy between the assessed amount and the revenue actually collected and that arrears were very often written off. Ultimately it was decided that the settlement was to be made on the basis of the actual collections of the year 1790-91.

For what period was the settlement to be made?

About this Shore and Cornwallis held different views. Shore held the view that considering the absence of proper survey or demarcation of estate boundaries and limited means of assessment, the settlement should be made for an initial period of 10 years. Cornwallis wanted to declare the settlement permanent and perpetual. He held the view that a 10-year period was too limited to induce any zamindar to clear away the jungles or introduce other permanent improvements in the land. The Court of Directors gave sanction to the view of Cornwallis.

The Settlement – The Zamindars were recognized owners of land and a 10years settlement was made with them in 1790. In 1793 the decennial settlement was declared permanent and the zamindars and their legitimate successors were allowed to hold their estates at that very assessed rate forever. The state demand was fixed at 89% of the rental, leaving 11% with the zamindars as their share for their trouble and responsibility.

Observations on the Settlement – Contemporary opinion claimed a number of advantages for the permanent settlement.

Financially, the permanent settlement secured a fixed and stable income for the state and the state could depend upon that income, monsoons or no monsoons. Further, it saved the government the expenses that had to be spent in making periodical assessments and settlements.

Economically, it was claimed that the Permanent Settlement would encourage agricultural enterprise and prosperity; waste land would be reclaimed and the soil under cultivation would be improved; the zamindars would introduce new methods of cultivation like rotation of crops, use of manure, etc. Thus, the settlement would create conditions for the development of the fullest power of the soil. This in turn would create a contented and resourceful peasantry.

Politically, Cornwallis expected that the Permanent Settlement should create a class of loyal zamindars who would be prepared to defend the company at all costs because their rights were guaranteed by the company. Thus, the permanent settlement secured for the government the political support of an influential class in the same way as the Bank of England had for William III after 1694. The zamindars of Bengal stood loyal during the great rebellion of 1857. Seton Karr commented that the ‘political benefits of the settlement balance its economic defects’.

Socially, the hope was expressed that the zamindars would act as the natural leaders of the ryot and show their public spirit in helping the spread of education and other charitable activities.

Lastly, the permanent settlement of Bengal set free the ablest servants of the Company for judicial services. Further, it avoided the evils normally associated with the temporary settlements, the harassment of the cultivator, the tendency on the part of the cultivator to leave the land to deteriorate towards the end of the term to get a low assessment, etc.

Disadvantages: Whatever little economic or political purposes the Settlement might have served during its first few years, it soon turned into an engine of exploitation and oppression. It created ‘feudalism at the top and serfdom at the bottom’. Many of the advantages claimed proved to be illusory.

Financially, the state has proved to be a great loser in the long run. The advantages of a fixed and stable income were secured at the great sacrifice of any prospective share int eh increase of revenue from land.

Even when new areas of land were brought under cultivation and the rents of the land already under cultivation had been increased manifold, the state could not claim its legitimate share int eh increase. The state demand fixed in 1793 remained almost the same even in 1954.

The Permanent Settlement retarded the economic progress of Bengal. Most of the landlords did not take any interest in the improvement of the land but were merely interested in extracting the maximum possible rent from the ryot. The cultivator, being under the constant fear of ejectment, had no incentive to improve the land. The zamindars did not live on the estates, but away in the cities where they wasted their time and money in luxury. Thus, the zamindars became a sort of ‘distant suction pumps’ sucking the wealth of the rural areas and wasting it in the cities. Besides, a host of intermediaries grew up between the state and the actual cultivator. This process of sub-infeudation sometimes reached ridiculous proportions, there being as many as 50 intermediaries. All the intermediaries looked to their profits and the ryot was reduced to the position of a pauper. In this context it may be worthwhile to quote the view of Carver who wrote: ‘Next to war, famine and pestilence, the worst thing that can happen to a rural community is absentee-landlordism’.

Politically, the permanent settlement did fit in the game of the Company and the Zamindars along with other vested interests became the favorite children of imperialism. However, the British administration gained the loyalty of the few at the cost of the alienation of the masses. Besides, the system divided rural society into two hostile classes, namely, the zamindars and the tenants.

Socially, the Permanent Settlement stands condemned. By recognizing the absolute right of ownership of the zamindars, the company sacrificed the interests of the peasants whether of property or occupancy. In a way the peasants suffered from a double injustice, first by surrendering their property rights and secondly by being entirely left at the mercy of the zamindars who rack-rented them. True, the government attempted rectification and passed tenancy legislation to protect the interests of the ryot, but the zamindars evaded the protective legislation. The growth of population resulting in an excessive pressure on land played into the hands of the zamindars and they not infrequently ejected the ryot. In fact, the peasant was reduced to the position of a serf.

In the beginning the zamindars themselves were in great difficulty. The state demand was pitched very high. Added to this over assessment was the harshness in the method of collection of revenue. The zamindars were required to deposit the revenue in the government treasury by the sunset of the last day fixed for the purpose failing which the lands were confiscated and auctioned. This ‘sunset’ law created great hardships and deprived many zamindars of their land for temporary difficulties. During 1797-98 estates worth 17% of the total revenue of Bengal were sold for non payment of the state demand in time. The ‘sunset’ law created so great insecurity that at one time no bidders were coming forth. The frequent changes in the ownership of land affected adversely the condition of the cultivators.

We might say in conclusion that a temporary settlement for 40 or 50 years, renewable again and again would have secured all the objectives Cornwallis had in view. It was hardly a wise policy measure to bind posterity for all times. If some Indian nationalists like Romesh Dutt gave their unquantified support to the policy of permanent settlement it was partly due to the fact that they themselves came from a class which was the beneficiary from the settlement of Bengal and partly due to the fear that the control of the bureaucracy would be worse than that of the zamindars. In the twentieth century, the economic insufficiency and social injustice of the settlement became very glaring. Besides it was found against the tenets of political or social justice. The Government of Free India has tried to set right the wrong done by Cornwallis. The West Bengal Acquisition of Estates Act, 1955, has abolished zamindari by paying compensation to the zamindars at a huge expense to the public exchequer.

WAS THE PARTITION OF INDIA INEVITABLE AND UNAVOIDABLE?

The answer to this question differs widely with the nationality of the writer- Indian, Pakistani or British.

In India the partition of the country is considered a tragedy. It is projected as the logical culmination of the long-standing British policy of Divide and Rule and the Muslim League’s ideology of communalism and separateness. The two worked together and forced the Indian National Congress to agree to the partition of India. Indian writers largely place the blame at the door of the Congress leaders and agree that if they had shown adequate understanding, tact and boldness, the partition of the Motherland could be avoided.

In Pakistan however, the partition is considered as quite logical and inevitable, and the growth of Muslim nationalism is traced in the depth of Indian History.

Among the British scholars there is no unanimity of opinion about the rationale of the partition of India and there is difference of opinion among historians and those writers who served the ‘raj’ in India.

Whatever the verdict of history, credit must be given to Mr. M. A. Jinnah for his adroit handling of the situation. He was a very shrewd politician and often dodged his political rivals by clever somersaults. He rose form strength to strength and earned the epithet of Qaid-i-Azam (Great Organizer).

Jawaharlal Nehru attributes the growth of Muslim communalism to the delay in the growth of a strong Muslim middle calss; this enabled the League to work up the psychology of fear among the emotionally excitable Muslim masses. The cry of ‘Islam in danger’ brought the Muslim masses under the banner of the League and Mr. Jinnah stood forth as the political messiah. All said, the acts of omission and commission on the part of the Hindu Mahasabha further fanned the fanaticism of the Muslim League.

Mr. V. D. Savarkar, the President of Mahasabha, advocated ‘a uncompromising doctrine of Hindu ascendency’ and openly announced that ‘the only way to deal with the Hindu-Muslim schism was to insist that all India was Hindustan and that the Muslims must reconcile themselves to the status of a minority community in a democratic state which orders life by majority rule.

Tuesday, 21 June 2022

MA Sociology Part I (Sem II) Paper II Notes: Marginalized Groups and Communities: Caste, Tribe & Gender

Click on the topic you want to learn / know about:

Unit I: Historical Context of Marginalization

• Margin, Marginality, and Marginalization

- Forms of Marginalization

- Causes of Marginalization

- Prejudice and Discrimination

• Marginalization of Caste, Class, Tribe, Gender and Minorities

• Multiple marginal Groups and their Discrimination, deprivation and Social Exclusion

- Marginalization and Social Exclusion

Unit II: Perspectives on Marginalization

• Mahatma Phule and Babasaheb Ambedkar

• Periyar Ramaswami and Verrier Elwin

• Tarabai Shinde and Pandita Ramabai

Unit III: Social Welfare and Issues of Rights

• Constitutional provisions for reservations

- Recommendations for Better Inclusion

• Issues of Representational

- Reservations for Economically Weaker sections of Society

- Disability

- Transgenders

- Women

- Gender & Reservation

• The Public Sphere

Unit IV: Contemporary Debates

• Critique of Cultural Nationalism and Hindutva

• Dalit feminist standpoint

• Tribes, Caste and Identity Politics

• Sexuality and Marginalization

DALHOUSIE’S DOCTRINE OF LAPSE

The doctrine of Lapse – Annexations of Peace

No account of Dalhousie’s work of imperial consolidation can be complete without the mention of the Doctrine of Lapse. Some important Indian states were annexed by the enforcement of the Doctrine. The Doctrine of Lapse can be better understood in the context of Dalhousie’s declared conviction that the old system of ruling through ‘sham royalties’ and ‘artificial intermediate powers’ resulted in the misery of the people. In fact, his logical and straight Scottish mentality wanted to tear the mask of Mughal sovereignty and dispossess Indian Princes who pretended to be descendants of the Mughals.

According to Dalhousie there were three categories of Hindu states in those days in India:

I - Those states which were not tributary and which were not and never had been subordinate to a paramount power.

II - Hindu prices and chieftains which were tributary and owed subordination to the British government as their paramount power in place of the Emperor of Delhi or the Peshwa, etc.

III - Hindu sovereignties and states which had been created or revived by the sanads (grants) of the British government.

Reviewing his policy in 1854, Lord Dalhousie explained that ‘in states covered by class I we have no right to their adoptions. In class II the rulers have to require our assent to adoption, which we have a right to refuse, but which policy would usually lead us to concede. In the principalities of the III class I hold that succession should never be allowed to go by adoption’.

The East India Company had acquired the position of supreme power in India after the fall of the Mughal emperor and the defeat of the Maratha Confederacy. Dalhousie maintained that ‘the British government in the exercise of a wise and sound policy is bound not to put aside or neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue as may from time to time present themselves, whether they arise from the lapse of subordinate states by the failure of all heirs of every description whatsoever, or from the failure of heirs natural where the succession can be sustained only by the sanction of the government being given to the ceremony of adoption, according to Hindu law’.

Dalhousie recognized the right of the adopted son to succeed to the personal property of the chieftain but drew a distinction between succession to private property and succession to the royal ‘gaddi’ in the latter case, he held, that the sanction of the Paramount power must be obtained. The Paramount Power could refuse ‘adoption’ in case of states covered by categories II and III and declare the states having passed back or ‘lapsed’ to the supreme authority. In such cases the ‘Right of Adoption’ was substituted by the Paramount Powers Right of Lapse’. The Power that gives, it was agreed, could also rightfully take it away.

Dalhousie did not invent the doctrine. As early as 1834 the Court of Directors had laid down that in case of failure of lineal successors the permission ‘to adopt’ was in indulgence that ‘should be the exception, not the rule, and should not be granted but as a special mark of favor and approbation’. Few years later in 1841, the home authorities decided in favor of a uniform policy and directed the Governor General ‘to persevere in the one clear and direct course of abandoning no just and honorable accession of territory or revenue while all existing claims of right are at the same time scrupulously respected’. It was in pursuance of the policy thus laid down that Mandavi state was annexed in 1839, Kolaba and Jalaun in 1840 and the titular dignity of the Nawab of Surat abolished in 1842.

Dalhousie’s contribution was that he uniformly applied this Doctrine of Lse and did not ignore or neglect any opportunity in consolidating the territories of the East India Company. He steadily enforce the principles previously laid down. Mr. Innes has summed up the position thus: ‘His predecessors had acted on the general principle of avoiding annexation if it could be avoided; Dalhousie acted on the general principle of avoiding annexation if he could do so legitimately’. It may be added that the over zealous Governor General treated some states as ‘dependent principalities’ or ‘subordinate states’ which rightly were ‘protected allies’. Dalhousie’s decision, therefore, had to be reversed by the Court of Directors in case of the old Rajput state of Karauli.

The states actually annexed by the application of the Doctrie of Lapse under Lord Dalhousie were Satara (1848), Jaitpur and Sambalpur (1849), Bhagat (1850), Udaipur (1852), Jhansi (1853) and Nagpur (1854).

Satara – was the first Indian State to be annexed. In 18348 the Raja of Satara, Appa Sahib died without leaving a natural son. He had, however, adopted a son somedays before his death but without the consent of the East India Company. Lord Hastings after destroying the Maratha power in 1818 had conferred this principality of Satara on Pratap Singh, the representative of the house of Shivaji and in his ‘sons and heirs and successors’. In 1839, the Prince had been deposed and replaced by his brother Appa Sahib. The Bombay Council held by Sir George Clerk advised against the annexation. Lord Dalhousie decided to regard it as ‘dependent principality’ and declared the state annexed. The Court of Directors approved Dalhousie’s decision. In the House of Commons Joseph Hume described the annexation as a victory of ‘might over right’, but the House of Commons acquiesced in the annexation.

Sambhalpur – Raja Narayan Singh, the ruler of the state, died without adopting a son. The state was annexed in 1849.

Jhansi – The Raja of Jhansi had originally been a vassal of the Peshwa. After the defeat of Bajirao II, Lord Hasting in 1818 had concluded a treaty with Rao Ramchand, constituting ‘him, his heirs and successors’ hereditary rulers of the territory on terms of ‘subordinate cooperation’. After the death of the Raja in 1835, the East India Company recognized a grad uncle Raghunath Rao, to succeed to the principality. The old raja died a few years later. Another successor Gangadhar Rao, from the royal family, was recognized in 1838. In November 1853, the ruler died without leaving a male heir and the state was declared escheat. The claims of the adopted son were disregarded.

Nagpur – This large Maratha state comprised an area of 80,000 square miles. In 1817, Lord Hastings had recognized an infant descendant of the Bhonsle family, Raghuji III as the Raja. The British resident, Sir Richard Jekins, acted as the Regent for ten years till 1830, when the boy came of age and the administration was transferred to him. The Raja died in 1853 without adopting an heir to the throne. The claims of the Rani to adopt a son were set aside and the state was annexed. The personal possessions of the late Raja were declared to be ‘fairly at the disposal of the government’ on the plea that those were purchased out of state revenues. Then followed the spoliations of the Nagpur Palace, the sale by auction of the jewels and furniture of the Bhosale’s palace, a sum of 200,000 pounds being realized by the ignominious sale.

Observations on the Doctrine of Lapse

During the rise and expansion of the British dominion in India, the East India Company from time to time had given assurances that not only the rights and privileges of the Indians but their laws, habits, customs and prejudices would be respected. The right of adoption has always been a great religious ceremony and greatly prized by the Hindus. Under the Mughals and the Peshwas the recognition of the Supreme power was usually obtained by the payment of a ‘nazrana’ or succession duty. Lord Dalhousie revived an obsolete custom and used it for imperial purposes. The Doctrine of Lapse, like the taxation during the ‘personal rule’ of Charles I was the revival of a feudal law and looked like an ‘act of spoliation under the garb of legality’.

The line of demarcation between ‘dependent states’ and ‘protected allies’ was very thin and amounted to hair splitting. In any case of disputed interpretation, the decision of the East India Company was binding and that of the Court of Directors final. There was no Supreme Court to give impartial verdict on the questions of right and wrong.

Lord Dalhousie broke with precedent and was on many occasions guided by imperial considerations. Even Leo-Warner admits that with regard to Satara and Nagpur ‘imperial considerations weighed with him…they were placed right across the main lines of communication between Bombay and Madras and Calcutta’.

The Court of Directors withheld their sanction to the annexation of Karauli on the ground that the state was a ‘protected ally’ and not a ‘dependent state’. Similarly, Bhagat and Udaipur were returned to their respective rulers by Lord Canning.

Dalhousie was an annexationist. He applied the Doctrine of Lapse to achieve his aggressive ends. Where the ‘Doctrine of Lapse’ could not be applied, as in the case of Oudh, he annexed it on the pretext of ‘good of the governed’. Rulers of Indian states believed that their states were annexed not by the application of the Doctrine of Lapse, but due to the ‘lapse of all morals’ on the part of the East India company. ‘Whatever might have been the facts, writes P. E. Roberts, ‘the natives did undoubtedly believe that het existence of all native principalities was the threatened’ and the extinction of all states was regarded to be a question of time only. Actions were conclusive proof of Dalhousie’s intentions. In fact, Dalhousie’s Doctrine of Lapse was a part of his imperialist policy and was based on the old doctrine of ‘might is right’.

Monday, 20 June 2022

WAS THE DEATH OF NAND KUMAR A JUDICIAL MURDER? DISCUSS

The trial of Nand Kumar 1775

The story of the conflict in the Council and the discomfiture of Warren Hastings and Barwell encouraged Nand Kumar, who had some old grouse against Warren Hastings, to bring some charges of corruption and nepotism against the Governor-General. On 11 March 1775, Francis produced a letter from Nand Kumar before the Council which charged Warren Hastings of having accepted Rs 3 ½ lakhs as gratification from Mumry Begum for appointing the latter as guardian of the minor Nawab, Mubarak-ud-Daulah. A few days later, Nand Kumar offered to appear before the Council to substantiate the charges. Warren Hastings refused to recognize the right of the Council to sit in judgement on him and dissolved the Council in a huff. Warren Hastings decried Nand Kumar as ‘the basset of mankind’, ‘a wretch’, and as coming from ‘the dregs of the people’. Warren Hastings’ action lent suspicion to the whole case and convinced the trio about the truth of Nand Kumar’s charges. The trio sought the advice of the law officers for the recovery of the amount from Warren Hastings.

Meantime, Warren Hastings and his friends planned a counter offensive against Nand Kumar. On 19 April 1775, one Kamal-ud-din brought charges against Nand Kumar and Fowke for having coerced him to sign a petition containing various allegations against Hastings and Barwell. The case was referred to the Supreme Court. A more sensational charge against Nand Kumar was filed by Mohan Prasad, a pleader, acting on behalf of the executor of a banker named Balaki Dass (deceased) alleging that a certain Jewels Bond purporting to be signed by Balaki Dass and to be an acknowledgement by him of a debt due to Nand Kumar was a forgery. On 6 May 1775, Nand Kumar was arrested for forgery and hanged by a majority decision of an European jury.

Critics of Warren Hastings and Impey have described the trial and execution of Nand Kumar as ‘a judicial murder’ and have accused Warren Hastings and Impey to have acted in collusion. Macaulay believed that Warren Hastings was the real prosecutor and wrote that ‘only idiots and biographers doubt that Warren Hastings was not the real prosecutor’. In this context the comments of Mr. Chambers, one of the four judges of the supreme court are revealing. He wrote, ‘I argued against the general unfitness of punishing forgery with death in this country. My arguments on this head were overruled in private as they had been in public. The credit of Nand Kumar’s evidence against the government was thus not only invalidated, it was destroyed entirely by taking the witness not only out of the way but out of the world’. Apologists of Warren Hastings like J. F. Stephen contend that the prosecution of Nand Kumar for forgery in 1775 was a mere coincidence and that Warren Hastings had no hand in the trial and ultimate punishment of Nand Kumar. One, however, cannot escape the conclusion that Nand Kumar was punished on weak evidence and the temper of the Chief Justice – Impey was a close friend of Warren Hastings – played the decisive part. True, the law of England provided for capital punishment for forgery, but the same had never been applied in Calcutta. A few years earlier the Mayor’s court in Calcutta which followed the English criminal law and pardoned a prominent Bengali, who was sentenced to death for forgery. Thompson and Garratt describe the whole affair as ‘a scandalous travesty of decency’ while P. E. Roberts attributes it to ‘anchor of judgment’ on the part of the judges and the sentence of death as ‘miscarriage of justice’. Evidently, the punishment accorded to Nand Kumar was excessive and even unjust because no Indian law prescribed death penalty for forgery.

CURZON’S ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH BRITISH (RULE) HOLD OVER TIBET

As early as 1774-75 Warren Hastings had sent George Bogle as the Company’s envoy into Tibet to develop trade relations with that country. A second envoy was sent in 1783 for the same purpose. The priestly hierarchy of Tibet joined by the Chinese Resident there foiled all such attempts. In 1886, the consent of the Chinese, who claimed suzerainty over Tibet, was obtained for the dispatch of a mission, but the plan fell through. The Tibetan-Sikkim dispute over common boundaries brought matters to the point of hostilities. A Sino-British Convention of 1890 demarcated the boundaries; it also considered questions pertaining to trade between India and Tibet which took the shape of a definite agreement by 1893. However, no actual trade resulted from this agreement for the Tibetans refused to accept this convention and China which claimed suzerainty over Tibet could not enforce it.

At the time of Curzon’s arrival in India the relations with Tibet had reached the point of deadlock. The Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was ineffective. The Viceroys letters to the Dalai Lama were returned unopened. Above all, the Russian influence at Lhasa was increased and alarmed Curzon. A Russian national, Dorjieff had won the confidence of the Dalai Lama and brought to Tibet Russian arms and ammunitions.

Curzon who had tried to forestall Russian influence towards the Northwest in Afghanistan and Persia could not remain indifferent to the Russian advances in Tibet. Rumors were also afoot about a secret Sino-Russian agreement for establishment of a Russian protectorate over Tibet. The protests of the Russian ambassador in London against the contemplated dispatch of a special mission to Tibet by the Government of India lent further suspicion to Russia’s designs in that quarter.

In 1903, with the permission of Home authorities, Curzon sent Colonel Younghusband with a small Gorkha contingent on a special mission to Tibet to ‘oblige (the) Tibetans to come to an agreement’. The Tibetans refused to negotiate and offered nonviolent resistance. Younghusband pushed his way reaching Gyantse on April 11 and Lhasa on 3 August 1904. The Dalai Lama fled away from the capital leaving the charge of administration in the hands of senior officials. Younghusband dictated terms on 7 September 1904 which provided that Tibet would pay an indemnity of Rs. 75 lakhs at the rate of one lakh rupees per annum. As a security for the payment, the Indian government was to occupy the Chumbi Valley (territory between Bhutan and Sikkim) for 75 years. Provision was also made for opening trade marts at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok. The Tibetans were also to respect the frontiers of Sikkim. Further clauses provided that Tibet would not grant any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, etc., to any foreign state, but give Great Britain some control over the foreign affairs of Tibet.

Mr. Brodick, the Secretary of State, charged the Government of India with disregard for his instructions in that the huge indemnity demanded was ‘in defiance of his express instructions’, or occupation of the Chumbi Valley for 75 years ‘as disobedience of orders’. Meantime, Lord Lansdowne gave assurances to Russia that no occupation or protectorate or even interference in the internal affairs of Tibet was intended. The Government of India defended the position of Younghusband but admitted ‘an error of judgment’ on its part. On the insistence of the Secretary of State and true to the pledge given to Russia the treaty was revised reducing the indemnity from Rs. 75 lakhs to Rs 25 lakhs and providing for the evacuation of the Chumbi Valley after three years. The valley was actually evacuated in Jan 1908.

Critics of Curzon’s policy hold that the Younghusband mission just gratified the imperialist tendencies of the Viceroy and that no permanent results followed. Only China gained out of the whole affair because the Anglo Russian Convention of 1907 provided that the two great powers would not negotiate with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. It must however be said that Curzon’s vigorous and determined approach counteracted all Russian schemes in Tibet – a great concern of the Viceroy.

EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS I SYLLABUS | UNIVERSITY OF MUMBAI

1. The concept of communication

Communication, its concepts, process Importance of Communication in Media; Differences between Technical and General Communication; Barriers to Communication; Measures to Overcome the Barriers to Communication.

2. Types of Communication

Types of Communication; Verbal Communication-Importance of verbal communication- Advantages of verbal communication- Advantages of written communication; Significance of Non-verbal Communication.

3. Oral communication and media

Anchoring, voice modulation, interview, public speaking, skits/ plays, story telling, panel discussions, voice over, elocution, debates and group discussion

4. Listening Skills

Listening Process; Classification of Listening; Purpose of Listening; Common Barriers to the Listening Process; Measures to Improve Listening; Listening as an Important Skill in Workplace.

Reading -English, Hindi or Marathi

1.Types of Reading -skimming and scanning Reading -examples Newspaper / Magazine article, TV, feature and documentary, radio features, commentary, bulletins, advertising copy, press release in English, Hindi OR Marathi. Recognizing aspects of language particularly in media. Importance of spelling.

2.Various aspects of Language Recognizing various aspects of language particularly related to media , Vocabulary 100 media words

3.Grammar & Usage Grammatical structure – spelling, structure of sentences, Active / Passive voice, tenses, Idioms , Phrases, proper usage of homophones, homonyms etc. (Kindly provide practice session- Test , Quiz etc)

Thinking and Presentation

1.Thinking Types of thinking (rational ,logical, critical, lateral etc) Errors in thinking ,Partialism, Time scale, Egocentricity Prejudices ,Adversary Thinking

2 .Presentation - its importance , Steps in Making a Presentation; Delivering a Presentation

Translation

1.Introduction To Translation

Concept, importance, need for translation, challenges in translation, problems and importance of Information and Technology in translation.

2.Interpretation

Interpretation: Meaning, Difference between interpretation and translation

3. Role of a translator Translator and his role in media, Qualities, Importance of Translator, Challenges faced by Translator

DID THE THIRD BATTLE OF PANIPAT DESTROY MARATHA POWER?

Political significance of the Battle of Panipat – Historians have held divergent views about the effects of the battle on the fortunes of the Maratha power in India. Maratha historians hold the view that the Marathas lost nothing of political importance by it except the loss of 75,000 soldiers, that Ahmed Shah Abdali practically gained nothing by it and the battle led to no decisive results.

G. S. Sardesai writes, ‘Notwithstanding the terrible losses in manpower suffered n that field by the Marathas, the disaster decided nothing. In fact, it pshed forward in the distant sequel two prominent members of the dominant race, Nana Phadnavis and Mahadji Sindhia, both miraculously escaping death on that fatal day, who resuscitated the power to its former glory. Not long after the Battle of Panipat, the Maratha power began to prosper again as before and continued to do so for forty years, until the death of Mahadji sindhia or until British supremacy was established early in the 19^th century by the Second Maratha War (1803). The disaster of Panipat was indeed like a natural visitation destroying life but leading to no decisive political consequences. To maintain that the disaster of Panipat put an end to the dreams of supremacy cherished by the Marathas is to misunderstand the situation as recorded in contemporary documents.

Sir J. N. Sarkar, on the other hand maintains, ‘It has become a fashion with the Maratha historians to minimize the political results of the third Battle of Panipat. But a dispassionate survey of Indian history will show how unfounded this chauvinistic claim is. A Maratha army, did no doubt, restore the exiled Mughal Emperor to the capital of his fathers in 1772, but they came there not as Kingmakers, not as the dominators of the Mughal Empire and the real masters of his nominal ministers and generals. That proud position was secured by Mahadaji Sindhia only in 1789 and by the British in 1803’.

J. N. Sarkar’s view seems more objective. The Maratha losses in manpower were great. Out of the total of about one lakh persons only a few thousands escaped alive. So great was the disaster that for nearly three months the Peshwa could not get authentic details about the casualties and the fate of the military leaders. Even the Peshwa succumbed to the news of the disaster. J. N. Sarkar writes ‘This battle by removing nearly all the great Maratha captains and statesmen including the Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao, left the path absolutely open and easy to the guilty ambition of Raghunath(rao) dada, the most infamous character in Maratha History. Other losses time could have made good, but this was the greatest mischief done by the debacle at Panipat’. G. S. Sardesai counters this argument when he writes, ‘Panipat, in itself, brought to the Marathas a unique experience in politics and war, and heightened their national pride and sentiment as nothing else could have done. The disaster instead of damping their spirits, made them shine higher as when a nation is on the path of advancement and progress, such ups and downs are inevitable. Such valiant soldiers as Dattaji, Jankoji, Ibrahim Khan, Sadashivrao, did not die in vain. They left their mark on the fortunes of their nation and prepared it for a greater effort such as the young Peshwa Madhavrao actually put forth. Out of death cometh life is only too true. Although one generation, the older one was cut off, the younger generation soon rose to take its place and perform the nations service as before. The disaster was felt as personal by almost every home in Maharashtra and every soul was stirred by it to rise to the Nation’s call’.

The disaster of Panipat certainly lowered Maratha prestige in the Indian political world. The Marathas who could not protect their dependents or themselves came to be looked upon as a weak reed to bank upon.

Again, the Maratha dream of an empire extending over all parts of India was irretrievably lost. True, the Marathas took the Mughal Emperor under their protection and escorted him to Delhi in 1772 and again in 1789, but they never made any attempt to recover the provinces of Punjab and Multan or to play the role of the wardens of the Northwest frontier.

Sidney Owen writes that by the third Battle of Panipat, ‘the Maratha power was, for the first time, shattered to atoms, and though the hydra-headed monster was not killed, it was not effectually scotched, that it remained practically quiescent, until great British statesmen were in a condition to cope with, and ultimately to master and disintegrate it’. Certainly, the battle cleared the way for the rise of the British power in India. ‘It is significant’, writes R. B. Sardesai, ‘that while the two combatants, the Marathas and the Musalmans, were locked in deadly combat on the field of ancient Kurukshetra, Clive, the first founder of the British Empire in India, was on his way to England to explain the feasibility of his dreams of an Indian Empire to the Great Commoner, Lord Chatham, then the Prime Minister. Panipat indirectly ushered in a new participant in the struggle for Indian supremacy. This is indeed the direct outcome of that historical event, which on that account marks a turning point in the history of India’.

Wednesday, 15 June 2022

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE OF PLASSEY

The battle – rather the rout of Plassey – was hardly important from the military view-point. It was a mere skirmish. The total casualties were 65 on the Company’s side and 500 in the Nawab’s army. The English army showed no military superiority either in maneuvers or strategy of the battle. It was desertion in the Nawab’s camp that gave Clive the victory. After Mir Mudan’s death treacherous commanders held the field. If Mir Jaffar and Rai Durlabh had remained faithful the outcome of the battle would have been different. It was treason that drove the Nawab from the battlefield, it was treason that removed the Nawab’s army from the battlefield, it was treason that made Clive the victor.

Perhaps it was in the game of diplomacy that Clive excelled. He played on the fears of the Jagat Seths, worked up the ambition of Mir Jaffar and won a victory without fighting. K. M. Pannikar believes that Plassey was a transaction in which the rich bankers of Bengal and Mir Jaffar sold out the Nawab to the English.

The Battle of Plassey is important because of the events that followed it. Plassey put the British yoke on Bengal which could not be put off. The new Nawab, Mir Jaffar, was dependent on British bayonets for the maintenance of his portion in Bengal and for protection against foreign invasions. An English army of 6000 troops was maintained in Bengal to help the nawab maintain his position. Gradually all real power passed into the hands of the company. How hopeless was the position of Mir Jaffar is clear from the fact that while he wanted to punish Diwan Rai Durlabh and Ram Narayan, the deputy Governor of Bihar, for disloyalty, the English held his hand. Mr. Watts, the British resident at Murshidabad, held considerable influence. Gulam Husain Khan, the Muslim historian noted that English recommendation was the only sure way to office. Very soon, Mir Jaffar found the English yoke galling and intrigued with the Dutch to oust the English from Bengal. Clive thwarted this design and defeated the Dutch at Bedara (Nov 1759). When Mir Jaffar refused to read the writing on the wall, he had to give place to Mir Kasim a nominee of the company in 1760.

The Battle of Plassey and the subsequent plunder – for there was not much different then between fair trade and plunder – of Bengal placed at the disposal of the English vast resources. The first instalment of wealth paid to the Company immediately after Plassey was a sum of 800,000 pounds, all paid in coined silver. In the graphic language of Macaulay, ‘the fleet which conveyed this treasure to Calcutta consisted of more than a hundred boats’. Bengal then was the most prosperous province, industrially advanced and commercially great. ‘The immense commerce of Bengal’ wrote Verilst in 1767, ‘might be considered as the central point to which all the riches of India were attracted. Its manufactures find their way to the remotest part of India’. The vast resources of Bengal helped the English to conquer the wars of the Deccan and extend their influence over northern India.

A great transformation came about in the position of the English company in Bengal. Before Plassey, the English Company was just one of the European companies trading in Bengal and suffering various exactions at the hands of the Nawab’s officials. After Plassey the English Company virtually monopolized the trade and commerce of Bengal. The French never recovered their lost position in Bengal, the Dutch made a last bid in 1759 but were humbled. From commerce the English proceeded to monopolize political power in Bengal.

Plassey proved a battle with far reaching consequences in the fate of India. ‘There never was a battle’ writes Malleson, ‘in which the consequences were so vast, so immediate and so permanent’. Col. Malleson certainly overstates the case when he writes that it was Plassey which ‘made England the great Mohammedan power in the world; Plassey which forced her to become one of the main factors in the settlement of the burning Eastern Question; Plassey which necessitated the conquest and colonization of the Cape of Good Hope; of Mauritius, the protectorate over Egypt’. Nevertheless, the battle of Plassey was an important event in the chain of developments that made the English the masters of India.

Eric Stoker, a modern writer, describes ‘the Plassey Revolution as the first English essay in private profiteering on a grandiose scale’. The consequences of Plassey shaped the form of British overrule and the modes of cultural contact.

Friday, 10 June 2022

MODERNIZATION OF JAPAN (1868-1893)

The Meiji era in Japan, under the dynamic leadership of Mikado (emperor) Mutsuhito, witnessed all round progress. Although the Meiji era continued up to 1912, we will however, restrict our discussion up to 1893 in this note.

During this period Japan adopted and assimilated European culture and civilization, political and economic institutions to some extent; and reformed and reorganized its army, developed its naval forces, and made a good beginning of industrialization and modernization as discussed below:

Political and constitutional innovations: The Meiji Restoration was followed by

1. - the abolition of feudalism in 1871,

2. - introduction of competitive civil service examinations for recruitment to the bureaucracy and

3. - promulgation of the constitution in 1889 as the gift of the divine Emperor.

Hence the constitution had about it an aura of sanctity. It was for this reason that the constitution remained unamended in its wording till after 1945.

Under this constitution, like the King of England, the Emperor of Japan was the fountain of all power; and like the English Cabinet Minister, the Japanese Ministers assumed full responsibility for his acts. However, unlike the King of England whose succession was fixed by Acts of the British Parliament, the Emperor of Japan was not subject to the parliament because he himself was divine and of divine ancestry.

The Constitution guaranteed certain basic rights to the Emperor’s subjects and cast upon them certain duties as well. It provided for the Imperial Diet or Parliament, consisting of two chambers

1. the house of Representatives, elected by about the one percent

2. a House of Peers, composed of members of the Imperial family, of higher ranks of nobility, of representatives of peers of lower ranks of nobility, of certain imperial appointees and of the highest tax payers chosen by their fellows.

Industrial and economic revolution: The Meiji era, during 1868-1893, also inaugurated the industrial and economic revolution in Japan. The mechanical appliances of the West were adopted and thus the industrial revolution was brought to Japan. New factories, mills and workshops were erected, railways and telegraph lines were build and steamships were constructed in 1877, the telephone was introduced in Japan. At the same time, foreign trade of Japan grew at great speed and currency and banking were developed on the western patterns. Postal savings banks were also introduced. In accomplishing the industrial and economic revolution, the government took the lead; and this was according to the general character of the revolution in Japan. The Japanese had a burning desire to keep their nation completely independent and strong against foreign powers. Hence the government of Japan was averse to borrowing more from abroad than seemed absolutely necessary, so that their jealousy cherished national autonomy might not be jeopardized by foreigners through their investments in, and loans to, Japan. The same national goal promoted the Japanese government to promote the growth of those industries which would assist the army and navy and which would at the same time complete with foreign products both at home and abroad. Accordingly, foundries, arsenals’ and shipyards were build. Mines were exploited. Paper mills, chemical works and glass and cement producing factories were build. By 1890 more than 200 steam factories sprang into existence. It was however not until after 1895 that phenomenal economic, industrial and technological developments occurred.

Intellectual changes: The Meiji Era witnessed numerous intellectual changes. The imperial government of Japan introduced compulsory primary education developed secondary and higher education and established universities patterned on the models of America and Europe. Trained and experienced teachers, professors, technicians, technologists, engineers and doctors and surgeons were imported from Europe and America. Thousands of books on science, history, political science, literature and many other subjects were translated from western languages to Japnese. Newspapers and periodicals appeared.

Modern Japanese army: The abolition of feudalism was followed by a change in the character of the army. In 1872 the beginnings of conscription were made and a nationwide plan was introduced for building the army form men of all ranks of society. This meant ‘a nation in arms’.

New Japanese Laws and Courts: The Japanese reorganized their laws and courts with a view to be freed from extraterritoriality which was viewed by them as a galling badge of national inferiority in 1890.

1. A new civils code patterned after western models

2. The code of commercial law patterned on the German model

3. The criminal code patterned after the French precedents, were promulgated.

By 1899, all codes were operational. As soon as the codes went into full operation, the Japanese whole heartedly to adopt the machines and the scientific techniques of the Far East. She also entered upon a path, which if pursued successfully, would make her its master’ (Ref: K. S. Latourette, A Short History of the Far East (1957) The Macmillan Co., New York, p. 421).

SINO JAPANESE WAR (1894-95)

Having fully developed her strategic industries and armed and naval forces, Japan aspired to become a Great Power in the Far East in particular and the world in general. The closing years of the 19^th century witnessed the Sino-Japanes War (1894-95), in which Japan won brilliant and easy victories over China and Korea.

Japanese interests in Korea: Prior to the Sino Japanese War, Korea was under the nominal suzerainty of China. The Chinese nominal control over Korea accompanied with continued chaotic conditions in Korea, menaced the security of Japan. Korea in the hands of an enemy was regarded by the Japanese as ‘a dagger thrust at the heart of trade interests in Korea. It was, therefore, essential for Japan to detach Korea from the Chinese connection and bring it under Japanese control.

War with Korea and China: In 1894, Japan served the King of Korea with an ultimatum to accept and implement the Japanese program of reforms. The King however, avoided the issue and consequently Japan attacked Korea and took away the King as a war prisoner. China also fought on the side of Korea was defeated. In less than a year, the Japanese overran practically the whole of Korea and southern Manchuria and were on the point of attacking Peking

Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895): The Sino Japanese War came to an end by the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895, under which

China recognized the full and complete independence of Korea.

China ceded the Liao-Tung Peninsula and Port Arthur in Manchuria and Island of Formosa to Japan and

China had to pay a war indemnity of twenty crore taels to Japan.