INDO PAK WAR 1971 AND THE FORMATION OF BANGLADESH

Indo-Pak War, 1971: Almost immediately after the 1971 general elections in India a major political-military crisis broke out in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). India was inevitably drawn into the fray, leading to a bloody war between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan had been created around the ideological assumption that because of their faith the Muslims of India constituted a separate nation. But religion was not enough to weld together the Punjabi speaking part of West Pakistan with the Bengali speaking East Pakistan. 

The West Pakistan political and economic elite soon acquired a dominant position in Pakistan’s army, bureaucracy, economy and polity resulting in economic and political discrimination against East Pakistan. Moreover, in the absence of political democracy, the Bengalis had no mechanism through which to remedy the situation. 

Consequently, over time, the people of East Pakistan developed a powerful movement for democracy in Pakistan and greater autonomy for East Pakistan. Instead of coming to terms with this movement, the ruling elite of Pakistan decided to suppress it and which ultimately transformed it into a movement for independence from Pakistan.

In December 1970, General Yahya Khan, the military dictator of Pakistan, held free elections in which Bengal’s Awami party under the popular leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won more than 99 percent of seats in east Bengal and an overall majority in Pakistan’s National Assembly. 

But the army and Yahya Khan, backed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the leading politician of West Pakistan, refused to let the Awami party form the government. 

When the Awami party started a civil disobedience movement to enforce the constitutional provision, in a sudden move on March 25, 1971, Yahya khan ordered a military crackdown on East Pakistan. Mujibur Rehman was arrested and taken to an unknown destination in West Pakistan. 

The West Pakistan army initiated a reign of terror, killing innocent citizens, burning villages and crops. Thousands of intellectuals and Bengali members of the police and army were indiscriminately but systematically eliminated in order to deprive the people of any leadership for over six months, the army committed rape, torture, arson, brutal killings and other heinous crimes. 

The Awami League leaders, who succeeded in escaping to Calcutta, formed a government of Bangladesh in exile, organized the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Army) and launched a fierce underground movement and guerrilla warfare.

The brutality of the Pakistan army was specially directed against the Hindus remaining in East Pakistan who were faced with virtual genocide. They, but also a large number of Muslims, Christians and Buddhists, were forced to migrate to and seek shelter in West Bengal, Assam and Meghalaya in India. 

By November 1971, the number of refugees from East Bengal had reached ten million.

In India there was a wave of sympathy for the people of East Bengal and a strong demand for swift action against Pakistan. But, Indira Gandhi, though convinced that war with Pakistan was likely, opposed hasty action. Throughout the crisis, she acted with immense courage but also with abundant caution and careful and cool calculation. She did not want to strengthen Pakistan propaganda that the entire movement for autonomy in East Pakistan and the consequent revolt was not a popular uprising but an Indian conspiracy. She did not want to do anything which would lead to India being accused of violating international law and norms.

In following a policy of restraint, Indira Gandhi had to other major considerations in view. First, if it was to be war, it should come at a time of India’s choosing as careful planning and preparations were necessary. Military operations in East Pakistan could not be undertaken during the monsoon when the large number of rivers and rivulets there would be in flood and the marshes impossible. The Himalayan passes would get snowbound only in winter making it impossible for China to intervene and send troops to aid Pakistan. The Mukti Bahini also needed time to gain enough strength to confront the Pakistani army in regular warfare.

Secondly, Indira Gandhi realized that international opinion had to be educated and won over to the cause of Bangladesh and made aware of India’s predicament in regard to the refugees and how they were placing an unbearable burden on India, endangering its economic and political stability. This she hoped would make other countries sympathetic to India.

For the next eight months, Indira Gandhi followed a four-pronged policy. India not only gave sanctuary to the Bangladesh government in exile, but the Indian army gave military training on Indian soil and material aid in money and military equipment to the Mukti Bahini. The Indian government was also generous in providing food, clothing, shelter and medical aid to the refugees in spite of being a tremendous strain on India’s resources.

 In April 1971, Indian armed forces began to prepare for swift military action, though in utmost secrecy, in case a peaceful solution of the refugee problem could not be found. Moreover, the military operation had to be swift and finished before the big powers succeeded in halting the conflict and imposing a ceasefire.

India’s campaign received a very positive response from the media, the intelligentsia and the students in the west and ultimately from the East European Communist countries. But the governments of the United States and China adopted a hostile attitude towards India. Ignoring Indian protest, the US continued to supply arms to Pakistan. It also tried to pose the problem of Bangladesh primarily as an issue between India and Pakistan rather than one of Bangladesh’s independence. China was fully supportive of Pakistan as it had become virtually its ally. In July-August 1971 Pakistan had helped to bring about a US-China Détente.

On December 3, Pakistan’s air force launched a surprise attack on light military airfields in western India, hoping to inflict serious damage on the Indian air force and also to internationalize the Bangladesh issue and secure UN intervention. 

The Indian air force was relatively unharmed; anticipating a Pakistani attack, the Indian air force had withdrawn beforehand to interior airfields.

India immediately recognized Bangladesh and gave a strong military reply. The Indian strategy was to hold the Pakistani forces in the western sector through strong defensive action, while waging a short, swift and decisive war in the east, forcing the Pakistan army there to surrender before the US, China or the UN could intervene.

Brilliantly led by General J. S. Arora, the Indian army, joined by the Mukti Bahini, virtually ran through East Bengal and reached Dacca, its capital, within eleven days, and surrounded the Pakistani garrison there. 

Indira Gandhi asked General Manekshaw, India’s Army Chief, to hurry the completion of India’s military plan. The Indian armed forces, having surrounded Dacca on 13 December, forced the defeated and demoralized 93,000 strong Pakistan army in Bangladesh to surrender on December 16.

Following the surrender in Dacca, on December 17, the Indian government announced a unilateral ceasefire on the Western front.

Pakistan readily accepted the ceasefire and released Mujibur Rahman, who came to power in Bangladesh on January 12, 1972.

India had several gains to show from the Bangladesh war. 

- The balance of power in South Asia had been altered with India emerging as the per-eminent power. 

- The grave refugee problem had been solved with the ten million refugees promptly and smoothly sent back to their homes in Bangladesh. 

- The humiliating memory of the defeat in 1962 was wiped out and India’s lost pride and self-respect restored. 

- India had not only defeated a troublesome neighbor but had asserted its independence in foreign affairs and in defense of her national interest. It had been shown that India was not a weak political entity on the world stage even if it was not yet a world power.

- The war had also demonstrated the strength of Indian secularism. Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, all had stood together as civilians or soldiers at this moment of crisis.

The Simla Agreement 1972: 

The war had ended; the ceasefire had come but peace had not. 

India still held over 90,000 prisoners of war and was in occupation of nearly 9,000 square kilometers of Pakistani territory. Pakistan was yet to recognize Bangladesh. Indira Gandhi realized that a mutually arrived at Indo-Pak settlement was necessary for a durable peace. A hostile Pakistan would not only force India to maintain a high level of defence expenditure but also enable outside powers to interfere in sub-continental affairs. 

A summit conference between Indira Gandhi and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the newly-elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, was held in Simla in June 1972; a great deal of hard bargaining took place and the two signed an agreement which came to be known as the Simla Declaration. India agreed to return the Pakistan territory it had occupied except some strategic points in Kashmir mainly in the Kargil sector, which were necessary to safeguard the strategic road link between Srinagar and Leh in Ladakh. 

In return, Pakistan agreed to respect the existing Line of control (LOC) in Kashmir and undertook not to alter it unilaterally by force or threat of force. 

The two countries also agreed to settle all disputes though bilateral negotiations without any outside mediation by the UN or any other power. 

India also agreed to return the prisoners of war to Pakistan but this was to be contingent upon a Bangladesh-Pakistan agreement. This occurred the next year when Pakistan recognized Bangladesh in August 1973.