SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WAVELL PLAN

 The Wavell Plan – 1945

Lord Wavell who had succeeded Lord Linlithgow as Governor General in Oct 1943, now made an attempt to resolve the deadlock in India. In March 1945, he went to England for consultations. The result of his consultations was soon reveled. On June 14, he broadcast to the people of India the proposals of the British government to resolve the deadlock in India. He proposed the reconstruction of the Governor General’s Executive Council pending the preparation of a new constitution. With the exception of the Governor General and the Commander in chief (who would retain his position as war member) all other members of the executive council would be nominated from amongst leaders of Indian political life. This Council would have a balanced representation of the main communities, including equal proportions of Muslims and caste Hindus. It would work, if formed, under the existing constitution. Though the Governor General’s veto would not be abolished, it would not be used unnecessarily. The portfolio of External Affairs (other than those of tribal, and frontier matters which had to be dealt with as a part of the defense of India) was to be transferred from the Governor General to an Indian member of the Council. A conference of representatives chosen by the Viceroy was to be convened with a view to obtaining from the leaders of the various parties a joint list, or, failing it, separate lists of worthy people to constitute the new executive council. It was expected also that provincial minister in section 93 provinces would resume office and that there would be coalitions.

The members of the Congress Working Committee were let out of jail, and high hopes prevailed on all sides as invitations for the proposed Simla Conference went out to the leaders including Gandhiji. Meeting on June 25, 1945, the conference was adjourned after three days of discussion. On July 11, Mr. Jinnah had a short interview with the viceroy, during which he seems to have made it clear to the latter that the League wishing to be regarded as the sole representative of the Indian Muslims, was firmly opposed to the inclusion of any non-leaguer Muslims in the Viceroy’s list. But the Viceroy could not agree to this point of view. Three days later, Lord Wavell wound up the conference by declaring a failure of the talks.

The responsibility for the failure lies partly on Lord Wavell himself and partly on Mr. Jinnah. At a Press Conference, Mr. Jinnah stated: ‘On a final examination and analysis of the Wavell Plan, we found that it was a snare… this arrangement by which… we would have signed our death warrant. Next, in the proposed Executive we would be reduced to a minority of one third. All the other minorities such as Scheduled Castes, Sikhs, and Christians have the same goal as the Congress. On the top of this came the last straw… that even about the five members of the Muslim bloc which were allotted to communal will… the Muslim League was not entitled to nominate all the Muslim representatives. But we finally broke as Lord Wavell insisted upon his having one non-leaguer, a nominee of Malik Khizr Hyat Khan representing the Punjab Muslims’.

The Congress President (Maulana Azad) put the responsibility for the breakdown squarely on the shoulders of Mr. Jinnah. Lord Wavell, however, cannot escape the responsibility either. Lord Wavell’s procedure could have been easily iproved upon. He should have taken the leaders into confidence as regards the composition of his own list of members of the executive council. Possibly the Congress leaders might have been persuaded to accept that list either as a whole, or with minor modifications mutually agreed upon. Then, he should not have allowed the league practically to veto the whole plan and thus alone to block the path of progress. (Gandhiji, on whom the Cripps Proposal had fallen flat, felt that the Wavell Plan was sincere in spirit and contained the seeds of independence). It must be noted in this connection that the viceroy had assured the Congress President that ‘no party to the conference could be allowed to obstruct settlement out of willfulness’, but it seems that as in the parallel case of Cripps’, Wavell’s hands were stayed at the last moment. One tangible result of the failure of the Simla Conference was to strengthen the position of Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League which was clearly manifested in the elections of 1945-46.