DISCUSS THE IMPACT OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES ON INDIAN SOCIETY AND CULTURE

Activities of the Christian Missionaries during British Rule: Christianity is reported to have entered India in the first century A.D. when St. Thomas landed on the Malabar Coast. By the 3^rd century A.D. the Syrian Christians had emerged as a body in the state of Kerala. During Akbar’s reign, in 1580, a Baptist Christian mission was set up at Fatehpur Sikri and its missionaries participated in the religious discussions at the ‘Ibadat Khana’. The Jesuit Missionaries are reported to have opened a Jesuit College at Agra in the times of Emperor Shah Jahan.

A new phase in East-West relations began when Vasco da Gama landed at Calicut in 1498. Vasco had explained the motive behind his visit thus: ‘We have come to seek Christians and spices’. The Portuguese Roman Catholic missionaries like Francis Xavier and Robert-de-Nobili, did some notable work in the field of opening some elementary schools and some orphanages.

In the 17^th and 18^th centuries, the Directors of the English East India Company and the English authorities in India adopted contradictory postures, sometimes encouraging missionary activities and at other times limiting missionary activities in India. In the 18^th century in particular the English East India merchants and officials, looked upon the Salvation Army (Christian missionaries) as a threat to their profits (they had in view the Mughal antipathy to the Portuguese Jesuits as a cautionary precedent) and put all sorts of restrictions on the entrance of missionaries in the Presidency towns.

The Seramur Missionaries – The Baptist missionaries from England – the trio, Joshua Marshman, William Carey and William Ward – wanted to start their activities from Calcutta. Lord Wellesley, the Governor General (1798-1805) considered them so ‘subversive’, ‘a menace to tranquility’, that they were banned from entering Calcutta, these missionaries were compelled to settle in the nearby Danish Settlement at Serampur. The Serampur trio did some useful work int eh field of education, setting up a printing press, translating the Ramayana and Mahabharata into English, besides attempting social reform.

The Evangelical movement in England added to the missionary influence and their popularity in London; it did influence the thinking of the Company’s Directors and the members of Parliament. As a result, the Charter Act of 1813 lifted the Company’s blanket ban on missionary activities in India, and missionaries from the UK could enter, reside, and openly preach. The Charter Act of 1833 went a step further and threw open India to missionaries of the whole world, who are free to preach and even settle in India. Consequently, many Germans and much funded American Protestant missionaries came to India. The Roman Catholic Missions also became more vigorous and their missionaries from all parts of the world poured into India.

Missionary comments on Hindu Socio-Religious Practices – The primary motive of the Christian missionaries was to convert the Indians to Christianity. In particular, they decried Hindu religion and their religious practices like idolatry and image-worship. To hammer their point, the Christian missionaries praised the tenets and practices of their religion. This evoked a sharp reaction in orthodox Hindu circles, though the missionaries did succeed in having some converts from the lower classes and in backward tribal and hill areas. All the same, the social and educational activities attracted the notice and praise of the newly western educated class.

The missionaries crusaded against the discrimination against women in Hindu society; social evils like infanticide, child marriage, polygamy, sati, forced widowhood, came under sharp condemnation. Practices like purdah, dowry system, the Devadasi practice (Bengal) and denial of proper education to women, also received their attention.

The rigidity of the caste system and untouchability were the other targets of the missionary attack. Though conversion amongst the lower castes were moderate, the inequality based on the caste system received the careful attention of the leaders of the various socio religious reformers.

The missionaries also turned over their attention to the neglected and primitive tribes like Santhals in Southern Bihar, the Marria-gonds in Madhya Pradesh and the numerous tribals in Garo hills and other areas in Northeastern state. The missionary efforts did attain some success in conversions.

In the field of social service, the missionaries were very active, though their humanitarian approach was an adjunct to their primary aim of conversions to Christianity. The missionaries opened many medical dispensaries, some hospitals and some medical institutions to win the hears of the weaker sections of Indian society. Similarly, they opened some orphanages for the physically handicapped and blind. Service centers were also opened during epidemics, famines, droughts, floods, etc. The missionaries won notable success in the field of education, production of vernacular literature, setting up printing presses and publications. In this field, the missionaries worked as pioneers, when they opened modern elementary schools, made provisions for teaching English language, set up teachers training institutions, set up special schools for girls, which provided vocational education also. The missionaries did valuable work in the field of adult education and carried on novel experiments in rural education in their schools at Moga, Salem, Madak, Ankaleshwar, Dernakal and at several other places. During 1936-37, there were 14,341 missionary institutions, with a total student strength of 1,118,200 on their rolls. The total expenditure involved was over Rs, 38 million.

In the political field, the missionary activity, particularly in the fields of political awakening and development of Nationalist outlook was only marginal.

An overview: Many Western scholars and apologists of missionary activities in introducing the modern printing press in India, opening of Westernized type of schools, commenting on the rich cultural heritage of the Indian classics, focusing attention of socio-religious evils in the Indian set up and popularizing humanitarian values in society. The missionary’s condemnation of deficiencies in Indian religious practices evoked reactions among Indian leaders, who earnestly turned their attention to socio-religious reforms in Indian society. Taken in this light – both in action and reaction – the missionaries become heralds of modernization in India.

DISCUSS WILLIAM BENTICK’S EFFORTS TO BAN SATI SYSTEM IN INDIA

No previous Governor General of India had ever tackled social problems with greater courage than Bentinck did. He tried to reform Hindu society by abolition of the cruel rite of Sati and suppression of infanticide. He crushed the gangs of assassins called ‘thugs’ and made peaceful living possible.

The term ‘Sati’ literally means ‘a pure and virtuous woman’. It is used in the case of a devoted wife who contemplates perpetual and uninterrupted conjugal union with her husband life after life and as a proof thereof burns herself with the dead body of her husband. The belief that the dead need company and victuals in their journey to far off Paradise was prevalent among many primitive peoples, and it was customary to bury, with the body of a chief, his drinking bowls, horses, dogs, and even his favorite wives and concubines. Probably this practice was brought to India by the Indo-Scythian invaders. In India its popularity was due to a false sense of conjugal duty sanctioned by society and religion, though the motivating urges were economic and moral.

Some enlightened Indian princes had taken steps to abolish this cruel practice in their dominions. Emperor Akbar had attempted to restrict it. The Marathas had forbidden it in their dominions. The Portuguese at Goa and the French at Chandernagore had also taken some steps towards its abolition. The East India Company had however adhered to its declared policy of non-interference into the social and religious customs of the people of India. Early British Governors-General like Cornwallis, Minto and Lord Hastings had taken some steps to restrict the practice of Sati by discouraging compulsion, forbidding administration of intoxicating drugs to the sorrow stricken widows, putting a ban on burning of pregnant women or widows below 16 years of age, and above all, making compulsory the presence of police officials at the time of sacrifice, who were to see that no compulsion was used. These restrictions, however, proved inadequate and unsuccessful.

Enlightened Indian reformers led by Raja Ram Mohan Roy urged William Bentinck to take necessary steps and declare the practice of Sati illegal. The loss of his sister-in-law by sati had stirred Rammohan Roy to action and he had published a number of pamphlets condemning the practice. His arguments were supported by many of the progressive Indian newspapers and the conscience of the nation had been awakened. William Bentinck provided the necessary legislative corrective. He collected relevant facts and figures about Sati cases, obtained the views of army officers, of the Judges of Nizamat Adalat, of the Superintendents of Police of the lower and upper provinces and came to the conclusion that there was no danger of mutiny or civil commotion. Regulation No XVII of December 1829 declared the practice of sati or burning or burying alive of widows illegal and punishable by the criminal courts as culpable homicide. The Regulation of 1829 was applicable in the first place to Bengal Presidency alone, but in 1830 was extended in different forms to Madras and Bombay Presidency.

No public disorders followed the enactment. A few orthodox Bengalis vainly made an appeal to the Privy Council against Government’s interference in their religious customs. Counter petitions were sent to the King by Rammohan Roy and Devendranath Tagore and William Bentinck was thanked for what he had done.

PERMANENT SETTEMENT IN BENGAL 1793

At the time of his appointment Cornwallis was specially directed to devise a satisfactory solution to the land revenue system in Bengal which should ensure the Company’s interest as well of the cultivators. The fist essential for a satisfactory approach to the problem was a thorough inquiry into the wages, tenures and rents prevalent in Bengal. Prolonged discussion followed in which the leading part was taken by Sir John Shore, the President of the Board of Revenue, Mr. James Grant, the Record Keeper and the Governor General himself. The discussion centered round three vital questions. With whom was the settlement to be made – the zamindars or the actual tillers of the soil? What would be the state’s share in the produce of the land? Should the settlement be for a term of years of permanent?

What was the position of the zamindar? Was he to be considered merely as a hereditary tax gatherer with no priority rights or was he the owner and proprietor of land? On this point John Shore and James Grant held opposite views. John Shore maintained that the zamindar was the owner of the land subject to the payment of annual land revenue to the state. As such the zamindar could bequeath the entire land to his children, sell it or mortgage it. This was the position in the later Mughal times, maintained Shore. James Grant, on the other hand maintained that the state was the owner of all land in the country, the zamindar was just the rent collecting agent and as such could be discarded at the will of the state. Cornwallis, who himself was an English landlord, accepted the viewpoint of Shore. Cornwallis’ viewpoint was very much affected by what was practicable. The company’s servants did not possess sufficient administrative experience to make a direct settlement with the ryot. The system of farming estates to the highest bidder had been tried for long with undesirable consequences. Thus, Cornwallis decided to make a settlement with the zamindars.

What was to be the basis for the revenue settlement?

James Grant maintained that the settlement should be made on the basis of the highest Mughal settlement, namely, that in force in 1765. Shore argued that in the Mughal times there was great discrepancy between the assessed amount and the revenue actually collected and that arrears were very often written off. Ultimately it was decided that the settlement was to be made on the basis of the actual collections of the year 1790-91.

For what period was the settlement to be made?

About this Shore and Cornwallis held different views. Shore held the view that considering the absence of proper survey or demarcation of estate boundaries and limited means of assessment, the settlement should be made for an initial period of 10 years. Cornwallis wanted to declare the settlement permanent and perpetual. He held the view that a 10-year period was too limited to induce any zamindar to clear away the jungles or introduce other permanent improvements in the land. The Court of Directors gave sanction to the view of Cornwallis.

The Settlement – The Zamindars were recognized owners of land and a 10years settlement was made with them in 1790. In 1793 the decennial settlement was declared permanent and the zamindars and their legitimate successors were allowed to hold their estates at that very assessed rate forever. The state demand was fixed at 89% of the rental, leaving 11% with the zamindars as their share for their trouble and responsibility.

Observations on the Settlement – Contemporary opinion claimed a number of advantages for the permanent settlement.

Financially, the permanent settlement secured a fixed and stable income for the state and the state could depend upon that income, monsoons or no monsoons. Further, it saved the government the expenses that had to be spent in making periodical assessments and settlements.

Economically, it was claimed that the Permanent Settlement would encourage agricultural enterprise and prosperity; waste land would be reclaimed and the soil under cultivation would be improved; the zamindars would introduce new methods of cultivation like rotation of crops, use of manure, etc. Thus, the settlement would create conditions for the development of the fullest power of the soil. This in turn would create a contented and resourceful peasantry.

Politically, Cornwallis expected that the Permanent Settlement should create a class of loyal zamindars who would be prepared to defend the company at all costs because their rights were guaranteed by the company. Thus, the permanent settlement secured for the government the political support of an influential class in the same way as the Bank of England had for William III after 1694. The zamindars of Bengal stood loyal during the great rebellion of 1857. Seton Karr commented that the ‘political benefits of the settlement balance its economic defects’.

Socially, the hope was expressed that the zamindars would act as the natural leaders of the ryot and show their public spirit in helping the spread of education and other charitable activities.

Lastly, the permanent settlement of Bengal set free the ablest servants of the Company for judicial services. Further, it avoided the evils normally associated with the temporary settlements, the harassment of the cultivator, the tendency on the part of the cultivator to leave the land to deteriorate towards the end of the term to get a low assessment, etc.

Disadvantages: Whatever little economic or political purposes the Settlement might have served during its first few years, it soon turned into an engine of exploitation and oppression. It created ‘feudalism at the top and serfdom at the bottom’. Many of the advantages claimed proved to be illusory.

Financially, the state has proved to be a great loser in the long run. The advantages of a fixed and stable income were secured at the great sacrifice of any prospective share int eh increase of revenue from land.

Even when new areas of land were brought under cultivation and the rents of the land already under cultivation had been increased manifold, the state could not claim its legitimate share int eh increase. The state demand fixed in 1793 remained almost the same even in 1954.

The Permanent Settlement retarded the economic progress of Bengal. Most of the landlords did not take any interest in the improvement of the land but were merely interested in extracting the maximum possible rent from the ryot. The cultivator, being under the constant fear of ejectment, had no incentive to improve the land. The zamindars did not live on the estates, but away in the cities where they wasted their time and money in luxury. Thus, the zamindars became a sort of ‘distant suction pumps’ sucking the wealth of the rural areas and wasting it in the cities. Besides, a host of intermediaries grew up between the state and the actual cultivator. This process of sub-infeudation sometimes reached ridiculous proportions, there being as many as 50 intermediaries. All the intermediaries looked to their profits and the ryot was reduced to the position of a pauper. In this context it may be worthwhile to quote the view of Carver who wrote: ‘Next to war, famine and pestilence, the worst thing that can happen to a rural community is absentee-landlordism’.

Politically, the permanent settlement did fit in the game of the Company and the Zamindars along with other vested interests became the favorite children of imperialism. However, the British administration gained the loyalty of the few at the cost of the alienation of the masses. Besides, the system divided rural society into two hostile classes, namely, the zamindars and the tenants.

Socially, the Permanent Settlement stands condemned. By recognizing the absolute right of ownership of the zamindars, the company sacrificed the interests of the peasants whether of property or occupancy. In a way the peasants suffered from a double injustice, first by surrendering their property rights and secondly by being entirely left at the mercy of the zamindars who rack-rented them. True, the government attempted rectification and passed tenancy legislation to protect the interests of the ryot, but the zamindars evaded the protective legislation. The growth of population resulting in an excessive pressure on land played into the hands of the zamindars and they not infrequently ejected the ryot. In fact, the peasant was reduced to the position of a serf.

In the beginning the zamindars themselves were in great difficulty. The state demand was pitched very high. Added to this over assessment was the harshness in the method of collection of revenue. The zamindars were required to deposit the revenue in the government treasury by the sunset of the last day fixed for the purpose failing which the lands were confiscated and auctioned. This ‘sunset’ law created great hardships and deprived many zamindars of their land for temporary difficulties. During 1797-98 estates worth 17% of the total revenue of Bengal were sold for non payment of the state demand in time. The ‘sunset’ law created so great insecurity that at one time no bidders were coming forth. The frequent changes in the ownership of land affected adversely the condition of the cultivators.

We might say in conclusion that a temporary settlement for 40 or 50 years, renewable again and again would have secured all the objectives Cornwallis had in view. It was hardly a wise policy measure to bind posterity for all times. If some Indian nationalists like Romesh Dutt gave their unquantified support to the policy of permanent settlement it was partly due to the fact that they themselves came from a class which was the beneficiary from the settlement of Bengal and partly due to the fear that the control of the bureaucracy would be worse than that of the zamindars. In the twentieth century, the economic insufficiency and social injustice of the settlement became very glaring. Besides it was found against the tenets of political or social justice. The Government of Free India has tried to set right the wrong done by Cornwallis. The West Bengal Acquisition of Estates Act, 1955, has abolished zamindari by paying compensation to the zamindars at a huge expense to the public exchequer.

WAS THE PARTITION OF INDIA INEVITABLE AND UNAVOIDABLE?

 The answer to this question differs widely with the nationality of the writer- Indian, Pakistani or British.

In India the partition of the country is considered a tragedy. It is projected as the logical culmination of the long-standing British policy of Divide and Rule and the Muslim League’s ideology of communalism and separateness. The two worked together and forced the Indian National Congress to agree to the partition of India. Indian writers largely place the blame at the door of the Congress leaders and agree that if they had shown adequate understanding, tact and boldness, the partition of the Motherland could be avoided.

In Pakistan however, the partition is considered as quite logical and inevitable, and the growth of Muslim nationalism is traced in the depth of Indian History.

Among the British scholars there is no unanimity of opinion about the rationale of the partition of India and there is difference of opinion among historians and those writers who served the ‘raj’ in India.

Whatever the verdict of history, credit must be given to Mr. M. A. Jinnah for his adroit handling of the situation. He was a very shrewd politician and often dodged his political rivals by clever somersaults. He rose form strength to strength and earned the epithet of Qaid-i-Azam (Great Organizer).

Jawaharlal Nehru attributes the growth of Muslim communalism to the delay in the growth of a strong Muslim middle calss; this enabled the League to work up the psychology of fear among the emotionally excitable Muslim masses. The cry of ‘Islam in danger’ brought the Muslim masses under the banner of the League and Mr. Jinnah stood forth as the political messiah. All said, the acts of omission and commission on the part of the Hindu Mahasabha further fanned the fanaticism of the Muslim League.

Mr. V. D. Savarkar, the President of Mahasabha, advocated ‘a uncompromising doctrine of Hindu ascendency’ and openly announced that ‘the only way to deal with the Hindu-Muslim schism was to insist that all India was Hindustan and that the Muslims must reconcile themselves to the status of a minority community in a democratic state which orders life by majority rule.

MA Sociology Part I (Sem II) Paper II Notes: Marginalized Groups and Communities: Caste, Tribe & Gender

Click on the topic you want to learn / know about:

 Unit I: Historical Context of Marginalization

• Margin, Marginality, and Marginalization

- Forms of Marginalization

- Causes of Marginalization

- Prejudice and Discrimination

• Marginalization of Caste, Class, Tribe, Gender and Minorities

• Multiple marginal Groups and their Discrimination, deprivation and Social Exclusion

- Marginalization and Social Exclusion

Unit II: Perspectives on Marginalization

• Mahatma Phule and Babasaheb Ambedkar

• Periyar Ramaswami and Verrier Elwin

• Tarabai Shinde and Pandita Ramabai

Unit III: Social Welfare and Issues of Rights

• Constitutional provisions for reservations

- Recommendations for Better Inclusion

• Issues of Representational

- Reservations for Economically Weaker sections of Society

- Disability

- Transgenders

- Women

- Gender & Reservation

• The Public Sphere

Unit IV: Contemporary Debates

• Critique of Cultural Nationalism and Hindutva

• Dalit feminist standpoint

• Tribes, Caste and Identity Politics

• Sexuality and Marginalization

DALHOUSIE’S DOCTRINE OF LAPSE

 The doctrine of Lapse – Annexations of Peace

No account of Dalhousie’s work of imperial consolidation can be complete without the mention of the Doctrine of Lapse. Some important Indian states were annexed by the enforcement of the Doctrine. The Doctrine of Lapse can be better understood in the context of Dalhousie’s declared conviction that the old system of ruling through ‘sham royalties’ and ‘artificial intermediate powers’ resulted in the misery of the people. In fact, his logical and straight Scottish mentality wanted to tear the mask of Mughal sovereignty and dispossess Indian Princes who pretended to be descendants of the Mughals.

According to Dalhousie there were three categories of Hindu states in those days in India:

I - Those states which were not tributary and which were not and never had been subordinate to a paramount power.

II - Hindu prices and chieftains which were tributary and owed subordination to the British government as their paramount power in place of the Emperor of Delhi or the Peshwa, etc.

III - Hindu sovereignties and states which had been created or revived by the sanads (grants) of the British government.

Reviewing his policy in 1854, Lord Dalhousie explained that ‘in states covered by class I we have no right to their adoptions. In class II the rulers have to require our assent to adoption, which we have a right to refuse, but which policy would usually lead us to concede. In the principalities of the III class I hold that succession should never be allowed to go by adoption’.

The East India Company had acquired the position of supreme power in India after the fall of the Mughal emperor and the defeat of the Maratha Confederacy. Dalhousie maintained that ‘the British government in the exercise of a wise and sound policy is bound not to put aside or neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue as may from time to time present themselves, whether they arise from the lapse of subordinate states by the failure of all heirs of every description whatsoever, or from the failure of heirs natural where the succession can be sustained only by the sanction of the government being given to the ceremony of adoption, according to Hindu law’.

Dalhousie recognized the right of the adopted son to succeed to the personal property of the chieftain but drew a distinction between succession to private property and succession to the royal ‘gaddi’ in the latter case, he held, that the sanction of the Paramount power must be obtained. The Paramount Power could refuse ‘adoption’ in case of states covered by categories II and III and declare the states having passed back or ‘lapsed’ to the supreme authority. In such cases the ‘Right of Adoption’ was substituted by the Paramount Powers Right of Lapse’. The Power that gives, it was agreed, could also rightfully take it away.

Dalhousie did not invent the doctrine. As early as 1834 the Court of Directors had laid down that in case of failure of lineal successors the permission ‘to adopt’ was in indulgence that ‘should be the exception, not the rule, and should not be granted but as a special mark of favor and approbation’. Few years later in 1841, the home authorities decided in favor of a uniform policy and directed the Governor General ‘to persevere in the one clear and direct course of abandoning no just and honorable accession of territory or revenue while all existing claims of right are at the same time scrupulously respected’. It was in pursuance of the policy thus laid down that Mandavi state was annexed in 1839, Kolaba and Jalaun in 1840 and the titular dignity of the Nawab of Surat abolished in 1842.

Dalhousie’s contribution was that he uniformly applied this Doctrine of Lse and did not ignore or neglect any opportunity in consolidating the territories of the East India Company. He steadily enforce the principles previously laid down. Mr. Innes has summed up the position thus: ‘His predecessors had acted on the general principle of avoiding annexation if it could be avoided; Dalhousie acted on the general principle of avoiding annexation if he could do so legitimately’. It may be added that the over zealous Governor General treated some states as ‘dependent principalities’ or ‘subordinate states’ which rightly were ‘protected allies’. Dalhousie’s decision, therefore, had to be reversed by the Court of Directors in case of the old Rajput state of Karauli.

The states actually annexed by the application of the Doctrie of Lapse under Lord Dalhousie were Satara (1848), Jaitpur and Sambalpur (1849), Bhagat (1850), Udaipur (1852), Jhansi (1853) and Nagpur (1854).

Satara – was the first Indian State to be annexed. In 18348 the Raja of Satara, Appa Sahib died without leaving a natural son. He had, however, adopted a son somedays before his death but without the consent of the East India Company. Lord Hastings after destroying the Maratha power in 1818 had conferred this principality of Satara on Pratap Singh, the representative of the house of Shivaji and in his ‘sons and heirs and successors’. In 1839, the Prince had been deposed and replaced by his brother Appa Sahib. The Bombay Council held by Sir George Clerk advised against the annexation. Lord Dalhousie decided to regard it as ‘dependent principality’ and declared the state annexed. The Court of Directors approved Dalhousie’s decision. In the House of Commons Joseph Hume described the annexation as a victory of ‘might over right’, but the House of Commons acquiesced in the annexation.

Sambhalpur – Raja Narayan Singh, the ruler of the state, died without adopting a son. The state was annexed in 1849.

Jhansi – The Raja of Jhansi had originally been a vassal of the Peshwa. After the defeat of Bajirao II, Lord Hasting in 1818 had concluded a treaty with Rao Ramchand, constituting ‘him, his heirs and successors’ hereditary rulers of the territory on terms of ‘subordinate cooperation’. After the death of the Raja in 1835, the East India Company recognized a grad uncle Raghunath Rao, to succeed to the principality. The old raja died a few years later. Another successor Gangadhar Rao, from the royal family, was recognized in 1838. In November 1853, the ruler died without leaving a male heir and the state was declared escheat. The claims of the adopted son were disregarded.

Nagpur – This large Maratha state comprised an area of 80,000 square miles. In 1817, Lord Hastings had recognized an infant descendant of the Bhonsle family, Raghuji III as the Raja. The British resident, Sir Richard Jekins, acted as the Regent for ten years till 1830, when the boy came of age and the administration was transferred to him. The Raja died in 1853 without adopting an heir to the throne. The claims of the Rani to adopt a son were set aside and the state was annexed. The personal possessions of the late Raja were declared to be ‘fairly at the disposal of the government’ on the plea that those were purchased out of state revenues. Then followed the spoliations of the Nagpur Palace, the sale by auction of the jewels and furniture of the Bhosale’s palace, a sum of 200,000 pounds being realized by the ignominious sale.

Observations on the Doctrine of Lapse

During the rise and expansion of the British dominion in India, the East India Company from time to time had given assurances that not only the rights and privileges of the Indians but their laws, habits, customs and prejudices would be respected. The right of adoption has always been a great religious ceremony and greatly prized by the Hindus. Under the Mughals and the Peshwas the recognition of the Supreme power was usually obtained by the payment of a ‘nazrana’ or succession duty. Lord Dalhousie revived an obsolete custom and used it for imperial purposes. The Doctrine of Lapse, like the taxation during the ‘personal rule’ of Charles I was the revival of a feudal law and looked like an ‘act of spoliation under the garb of legality’.

The line of demarcation between ‘dependent states’ and ‘protected allies’ was very thin and amounted to hair splitting. In any case of disputed interpretation, the decision of the East India Company was binding and that of the Court of Directors final. There was no Supreme Court to give impartial verdict on the questions of right and wrong.

Lord Dalhousie broke with precedent and was on many occasions guided by imperial considerations. Even Leo-Warner admits that with regard to Satara and Nagpur ‘imperial considerations weighed with him…they were placed right across the main lines of communication between Bombay and Madras and Calcutta’.

The Court of Directors withheld their sanction to the annexation of Karauli on the ground that the state was a ‘protected ally’ and not a ‘dependent state’. Similarly, Bhagat and Udaipur were returned to their respective rulers by Lord Canning.

Dalhousie was an annexationist. He applied the Doctrine of Lapse to achieve his aggressive ends. Where the ‘Doctrine of Lapse’ could not be applied, as in the case of Oudh, he annexed it on the pretext of ‘good of the governed’. Rulers of Indian states believed that their states were annexed not by the application of the Doctrine of Lapse, but due to the ‘lapse of all morals’ on the part of the East India company. ‘Whatever might have been the facts, writes P. E. Roberts, ‘the natives did undoubtedly believe that het existence of all native principalities was the threatened’ and the extinction of all states was regarded to be a question of time only. Actions were conclusive proof of Dalhousie’s intentions. In fact, Dalhousie’s Doctrine of Lapse was a part of his imperialist policy and was based on the old doctrine of ‘might is right’.

WAS THE DEATH OF NAND KUMAR A JUDICIAL MURDER? DISCUSS

The trial of Nand Kumar 1775

The story of the conflict in the Council and the discomfiture of Warren Hastings and Barwell encouraged Nand Kumar, who had some old grouse against Warren Hastings, to bring some charges of corruption and nepotism against the Governor-General. On 11 March 1775, Francis produced a letter from Nand Kumar before the Council which charged Warren Hastings of having accepted Rs 3 ½ lakhs as gratification from Mumry Begum for appointing the latter as guardian of the minor Nawab, Mubarak-ud-Daulah. A few days later, Nand Kumar offered to appear before the Council to substantiate the charges. Warren Hastings refused to recognize the right of the Council to sit in judgement on him and dissolved the Council in a huff. Warren Hastings decried Nand Kumar as ‘the basset of mankind’, ‘a wretch’, and as coming from ‘the dregs of the people’. Warren Hastings’ action lent suspicion to the whole case and convinced the trio about the truth of Nand Kumar’s charges. The trio sought the advice of the law officers for the recovery of the amount from Warren Hastings.

Meantime, Warren Hastings and his friends planned a counter offensive against Nand Kumar. On 19 April 1775, one Kamal-ud-din brought charges against Nand Kumar and Fowke for having coerced him to sign a petition containing various allegations against Hastings and Barwell. The case was referred to the Supreme Court. A more sensational charge against Nand Kumar was filed by Mohan Prasad, a pleader, acting on behalf of the executor of a banker named Balaki Dass (deceased) alleging that a certain Jewels Bond purporting to be signed by Balaki Dass and to be an acknowledgement by him of a debt due to Nand Kumar was a forgery. On 6 May 1775, Nand Kumar was arrested for forgery and hanged by a majority decision of an European jury.

Critics of Warren Hastings and Impey have described the trial and execution of Nand Kumar as ‘a judicial murder’ and have accused Warren Hastings and Impey to have acted in collusion. Macaulay believed that Warren Hastings was the real prosecutor and wrote that ‘only idiots and biographers doubt that Warren Hastings was not the real prosecutor’. In this context the comments of Mr. Chambers, one of the four judges of the supreme court are revealing. He wrote, ‘I argued against the general unfitness of punishing forgery with death in this country. My arguments on this head were overruled in private as they had been in public. The credit of Nand Kumar’s evidence against the government was thus not only invalidated, it was destroyed entirely by taking the witness not only out of the way but out of the world’. Apologists of Warren Hastings like J. F. Stephen contend that the prosecution of Nand Kumar for forgery in 1775 was a mere coincidence and that Warren Hastings had no hand in the trial and ultimate punishment of Nand Kumar. One, however, cannot escape the conclusion that Nand Kumar was punished on weak evidence and the temper of the Chief Justice – Impey was a close friend of Warren Hastings – played the decisive part. True, the law of England provided for capital punishment for forgery, but the same had never been applied in Calcutta. A few years earlier the Mayor’s court in Calcutta which followed the English criminal law and pardoned a prominent Bengali, who was sentenced to death for forgery. Thompson and Garratt describe the whole affair as ‘a scandalous travesty of decency’ while P. E. Roberts attributes it to ‘anchor of judgment’ on the part of the judges and the sentence of death as ‘miscarriage of justice’. Evidently, the punishment accorded to Nand Kumar was excessive and even unjust because no Indian law prescribed death penalty for forgery.