‘DECCAN PROVED THE ULCER FOR AURANGZEB’? DISCUSS

 

DO YOU AGREE WITH THE VIEW THAT ‘DECCAN PROVED THE ULCER FOR AURANGZEB’? DISCUSS

During the first half of Aurangzeb’s reign his attention was engrossed with affairs in the north, and the Deccan was left to the viceroys. The decadent southern Sultanates had not been able to recover fully from the blows that had been inflicted on them, and the Marathas rose at their expense. The rise of the Marathas, as a sort of challenge to the Mughal Empire, complicated the political situation in the Deccan, the full significance of which the Emperor could not realize at first. During the first 24 years of his reign his viceroys in the Deccan could achieve no definite success either against the Sultanates or against the Marathas.

The death of Shivaji in 1680 in no way improved the imperial position in the Deccan, not withstanding Aurangzeb’s determination to consolidate his supremacy. The flight of the rebellious Prince Akbar to the Maratha King Shambhuji, and the alliance between the disturber of India and the infernal father, as Aurangzeb called these two, brought a complete change in his policy towards the Deccan. Having now realized the necessity of marching there in person to check this menace to imperial interests he patched up a peace with Mewar in June 1681. Leaving Ajmer for the Deccan on 8^th September 1681, he arrived at Burhanpur on 23^rd November 1681 and at Ahmednagar on 1^st April 1682. His mind must have been full of high hopes and he could not foresee that destiny was dragging him to the south to dig the graves of himself and his empire. The first four years were spent in unsuccessful attempts to seize Prince Akbar and in rather disastrous campaigns against the Marathas.

The conquest of the decayed Sultanates next engaged the Emperor’s attention. Aurangzeb’s attitudes towards the Shiah Sultanates of the Deccan was influenced partly by imperial interests and partly by religious considerations. Bijapur, weakened by party factions and the rise of the Marathas, submitted to the invaders. The Emperor himself went on the last Mughal siege of the city.

According to writers like Elphinstone and Smith, the annihilation of the Southern Sultanates was an impolitic step of the part of Aurangzeb. They hold that it freed the Maratha chiefs from any fear of local rivalry, which the Mughal Emperor might have utilized to his advantage against he Marathas. But it is doubtful in any sincere alliance between the Sultanates and the aggressor, the Mughal Emperor was possible and also if they could check the rise of the Marathas. As Sir J. N. Sarkar observes, ‘since Akbar had crossed the Vindhyas, the Deccan Sultanates could never forget that the sleepless aim of the Mughal Emperors was the final extinction and annexation of all their territories’. He also points out that it would have been impossible for the decadent Sultanates to check the Marathas effectively as they had already organized themselves into a progressive national state.

Having achieved one of the two objects of his Deccan policy, i.e., the annexation of the decadent Sultanates of the Deccan, Aurangzeb turned towards the other, i.e., suppression of the renascent Maratha power. His attempts were at first crowned with success. Shambhuji was executed on the 11^th of March 1689, his capital Rajgarh was captured and though his brother Rajaram, escaped, the rest of his family, including his younger son Shahu were made prisoners. In the course of the next few years the Emperor extended his conquests further South and levied tribute on the Hindu states of Tanjore and Trichinopoly.

In fact by the year 1690 Aurangzeb had already reached the zenith of his power and was the lord paramount of almost the whole of India – from Kabul to Chittagong and from Kashmir to Kaveri. ‘All seemed to have been gained by Aurangzeb now; but in reality all was lost. It was the beginning of his end. The saddest and most hopeless chapter of his life was now opened. The Mughal empire had become too large to be governed by one man or from one center… His enemies rose on all sides; he could defeat but not crush them forever… Lawlessness was reigned in many places of Northern and Central India. The old emperor in the far off Deccan lost all control over his officers in Hindustan, and the administration grew slack and corrupt; chiefs and zamindars defied the local authorities and asserted themselves, filling the country with tumult. In the province of Agra in particular, there was chronic disorder. Art and learning decayed at the withdrawl of imperial patronage; not a single edifice, finely written manuscript, or exquisite picture, commemorates Aurangzeb’s reign. The endless war in the Deccan exhausted his treasury; the government turned bankrupt, the soldiers, starving from arrears of pay, mutinied; and during the closing years of his reign the revenue of Bengal, regularly sent by the able Diwan Murshid Quli Khan, was the sole support of the Emperor’s household or his army, and the arrival was eagerly looked forward to. Napoleon I used to say, ‘It was the Spanish ulcer which ruined me’. The Deccan ulcer ruined Aurangzeb. The Emperor failed to subjugate the Marathas or conquer their land. They recovered by 1691 and carried on a war of national resistance against the Mughals, first under Rajaram and some other Maratha chiefs and then after Rajaram’s death in 1700, under his brave widow Tarabai.